“Not Quite Mechanical:” Tanks and Men on the Western Front by Bartels, K'Tera (Author) et al.
 “Not Quite Mechanical:”  
Tanks and Men on the Western Front  
by 
KTera Bartels 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  
Master of Arts  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved August 2018 by the 
Graduate Supervisory Committee:  
 
Christopher Jones, Chair 
Volker Benkert 
Victoria Thompson 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY  
December 2018  
 i 
 
ABSTRACT 
In 1916, in the middle of the First World War, Britain developed and deployed the first 
military tanks on a battlefield, signifying a huge step forward in the combination of mechanization 
and the military. Tanks represented progress in technical and mechanical terms, but their 
introduction to military goals and military environments required the men involved to develop 
immaterial meanings for the tanks. Tactically, tanks required investment from tank commanders 
and non-tank commanders alike, and incorporating tanks into the everyday routine of the 
battlefront required men to accommodate these machines into their experiences and 
perspectives. Reporting the actions of the tanks impelled newspapers and reporters to find ways 
of presenting the tanks to a civilian audience, tying them to British perspectives on war and 
granting them positive associations. This thesis sought to identify major concepts and ideas as 
applied to the British tanks deployed on the Western Front in the First World War, and to better 
understand how British audiences, both military and civilian, understood and adopted the tank 
into their understanding of the war. Different audiences had different expectations of the tank, 
shaped by the environment in which they understood it, and the reaction of those audiences laid 
the foundation for further development of the tank. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In September 1916, the British army utilized tanks on the Western Front for the first time, 
introducing a new weapon into a war that had witnessed many similar transformations. As 
technical innovations, the tanks were part of a shift towards mechanization, slowly developing 
alternatives to raw manpower or horsepower in military environments. However, the usage and 
the presence of the tanks in the First World War did not mean that everyone who interacted with 
the tanks understood their purpose or even supported their production. Developing the tanks as 
machines required initial investment from engineers, but gathering support from the army, the 
government, and the civilians of Britain was a process that developed throughout the war. People 
responded to the tanks in different ways and adapted them into their memories of the war and 
their understanding of the war based on their perspective or position. For tacticians and 
designers, the tank was most useful as a concept, an indicator of mechanical progress that would 
revolutionize warfare. For the early tank crews, the tank made physical demands and enforced 
organizational boundaries that defined them as tank men without removing them from the 
stresses of the front line. For civilians on the home front, the tanks became part of the expanding 
propaganda efforts, providing a tangible reference to the war effort and a visual display of 
patriotism. Studying the tank through the lens of its different audiences reveals the variety of 
interpretation applied to the early British tank. 
To consider the various audiences for the tanks and understand them in turn, clear 
definitions of these audiences are necessary. Beginning in 1914, an administrative nucleus of 
men who focused on the tanks emerged, drawing on technical knowledge and innovation to 
propose a solution to the apparent stagnation on the Western Front. Their work had begun with 
early proposals bandied between the War Office and the Admiralty, but delays and 
miscommunication stalled tank production until 1916.
1
 In the face of this resistance, the men who 
believed in the concept of the tank clung to their projections of a mobile tractor or enormous 
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armored car capable of penetrating enemy lines.
2
 As the tanks emerged onto the battlefield, it 
became clear that they did not fit easily into traditional military roles: they were too slow to 
substitute for cavalry, yet their armor capabilities made them more resilient than the infantry, and 
their 6-pounder Hotchkiss guns gave them firepower enough to perform like artillery guns. The 
development of the Tank Corps administration allowed Major J.F.C. Fuller to begin outlining his 
own presentation of tank tactics, waging a private war of correspondence against Haig’s 
administration and fighting with the War Office to insist that tanks were viable weapons if given 
the proper chance.
3
 Though the physical tanks had their own material needs, Fuller hoped to 
provide for their administrative needs, giving them the tactical theory necessary to justify their 
continued production. 
Another important audience can be found in the tank crews and tank men who formed 
the personnel of the early Tank Corps. The tank crews interacted with the tanks daily, whether 
training behind the lines or active on the front lines.
4
 Unlike Fuller or tank designers, tank crews 
did not develop theories about tank use and focused instead on the immediate needs of their unit. 
Commanders found the collection of a new branch of men, hastily designed and haphazardly 
collected from other branches, a serious barrier to any kind of cooperation or community.
5
 The 
process of training, the rigor of battle, and even the freedom to play and relax all provided tank 
crews with material to ground their understanding of their new roles, and for them to incorporate 
their tanks into their experience of the war.  
Finally, after the tanks had seen action, news of their existence finally reached the civilian 
population of Britain. At first, newspapers were limited to passing along descriptions and artist’s 
sketches, since censorship prevented the publication of photographs of the tanks. By November 
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1916, photographs reached the British press, and in January of 1917, a war film including scenes 
of tanks was available in British cinemas.
6
 Tank images and memorabilia remained popular after 
their introduction, culminating in the Tank Bank campaigns of 1917-1918 which brought real tanks 
into the cities and streets of Britain. With the chance to touch (and on rare occasions, ride) a tank, 
civilians could begin to experience the tanks even more vividly than in photographs or film. 
Newspaper reports primed civilians to understand the tanks as emblems of British progress, 
indicative of British victory. The Tank Bank campaigns also  confirmed this perception of tanks, 
using the tanks as a visible measure of British industrial production to encourage munitions 
workers and observers on the home front.
7
 The purchase of war bonds through the Tank Bank 
campaign reflected the impact of the tanks and provided the clearest link between the tanks and 
their financial and national meaning.
8
 Initial textual and photographic descriptions prepared British 
civilians to accept the tanks by lending them entertaining traits instead of menacing ones, and the 
continued use of tank imagery in war films, entertainment, and fundraising efforts reinforced the 
tank’s positive connection to patriotism and the war effort.  
Tanks have earned attention from academics since their initial deployment, but a deep 
consideration of their intangible meanings and requirements has only been visible in recent years. 
Some historians have chosen to emphasize the technical aspects of the tank: works like those by 
Richard Ogorkiewicz explore these details at length, explaining the various requirements that 
effected changes in tank designs from model to model, and even the differences in designs 
between countries.
9
 These technical changes reflect the various tactical approaches of their 
designers, but Ogorkiewicz does not evaluate how these changes affected the perception of the 
tank among non-tacticians. The work of David Fletcher is vital as a means of accessing personal 
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experiences from tank crews in the First World War, consolidating the archives from the 
Bovington Tank Museum in England into accessible, structured works that present the 
experiences of the war as tank men remembered them.
10
 Again, Fletcher’s work explores the 
action of the war and the movement of the tanks in great detail, but lacks in-depth reference to 
audiences outside of the tank crews or technical staff. Without the contrast afforded by a 
comparison of audiences, Fletcher’s work offers only partial conclusions. Patrick Wright, in his 
book Tank, follows the tank from 1916 through the present day, exploring its technical 
requirements, the adoption of the tank into various national militaries, and how the tank’s 
inclusion in warfare changed cultural references to warfare.
11
 By moving through a litany of 
different wars and different nations, Wright is able to highlight the role tanks played for different 
nations in both a military and cultural sense. Wright’s work is the primary resource that attempts 
to move between the tangible and intangible so explicitly, and it is his inclusion of various 
audiences that this thesis seeks to emulate.  
Evidence for this study comes from a variety of sources. For British tank crews, the 
majority of their personal accounts are held by the Bovington Tank Museum or the Imperial War 
Museum.
12
 Some individuals published their memoirs as full books, but shorter accounts and oral 
interviews conducted by the Imperial War Museum are also useful in examining the personal 
perspectives of these men.
13
 To understand Major Fuller’s perspective and shift attention to the 
men involved in the administration of the tank, sources are available in Fuller’s various 
publications, including his own memoir and his account of the history of the Tank Corps from 
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1914 to 1918.
14
 Lieutenant-Colonel Stern, an Admiralty secretary in charge of early tank 
development, also published a history of the tank’s development in Britain.
15
 Another early 
overseer, Colonel Ernest Swinton, gave his own assessment of the events as part of his personal 
memoir, attempting to provide another perspective of the tank’s development from a more 
dramatic viewpoint.
16
 Though Fuller provided the greatest wealth of specific documents and clear 
explanations about tank tactics and administrative practices, these other insights also provide 
needed context for the initial development of the tank. Moving to a civilian audience opens up a 
much wider pool of sources, primarily in the form of newspapers. At first, newspaper reports 
communicated the actions of the tanks at the front, but as tanks remained popular, newspapers 
also reported on the production of war films including tanks, the tours of performers with tank-
based routines, and the efficacy of the Tank Bank fundraising campaign that allowed civilians to 
interact with a tank. Material items like souvenirs and memorabilia also provide access to a 
civilian understanding of the tanks, and records of the Tank Banks give a glimpse at the influence 
the tanks earned during the war years.
17
  
This thesis seeks to define and clarify how these various audiences understood the tank, 
and how the tank fit into existing perspectives held by their viewers. By moving between different 
audiences, this essay will demonstrate the different features and methods by which these 
audiences understood the role of the tanks in their lives. Concentrating specifically on the tank 
also allows for a greater exploration of the nuance in its representation, avoiding large-scale 
generalizations about technology in the First World War to instead identify which aspects of the 
tanks were emphasized and which were minimized in the minds of their audiences. 
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CHAPTER 1 
To understand the use of tanks in the First World War, it is necessary to first look to the 
men who designed them, supplied their units, and organized their movements. The First World 
War was an administrative war, waged with clerks and secretaries alongside the front-line infantry 
and artillery. “Command in this sense, as it evolved in the course of the war, was as much a 
matter of the bureaucracy and technology of communication and staff procedures as personal 
military leadership, although many generals combined both functions in themselves.”
18
 The 
leadership and administration of the early tanks thus formed a crucial part of their development 
within the British army, and this administration had to develop their own understanding of the 
tanks in order to design and implement them effectively. In this chapter, I will examine the 
administration of the early British tank administration to determine how they understood the tanks 
through lenses of theory and design, beginning with the Landships Committee formed under 
Albert Stern. After the tanks left the development stage, focus then shifts to J.F.C. Fuller, whose 
tactical discussions helped define the early tanks and propose their likely uses. 
Though most of the difficulties and advantages of early tanks came from their novelty, 
early administrators were fully cognizant of how tanks also echoed similar designs and concepts 
from the history of warfare. As a student of tactics, Major J.F.C. Fuller was eager to explain how 
the tank formed a vital advancement in armored warfare, much like the knight in armor and the 
siege engine of the medieval period had dominated battlefields and the phalanx of the ancient 
world had utilized the shield to maximum effect.
19
 Other authors, including Sir Basil Liddell Hart, 
found connections between the tanks and earlier designs, especially Leonardo da Vinci’s plans 
for a horse-drawn battle wagon.
20
 The idea of making armor mobile had engaged military minds 
for centuries, yet by the First World War, such a combination had not yet become a mechanical 
reality. 
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On a smaller scale, the specific concept of the tank arose from a variety of sources. The 
variety of the tank’s origin is best presented in the controversies that arose after the First World 
War and the lawsuits and that commenced once the tank was no longer a matter of military 
secrecy: Sir William Tritton, Major Wilson, Colonel Ernest Swinton, an Australian Mr. Lance de 
Mole, and even the author H.G. Wells were drawn into various legal and semi-public arguments 
regarding the “true” inventor of the tank. Not only were these men working on their concepts at 
different times, but each man had different methods of designing a tank, and worked in radically 
different ways. 
Chronologically, Wells had the best claim to designing a tank. In his story “The Land 
Ironclads”, published in The Strand magazine in 1903, he described a European war in which one 
side utilizes enormous armored machines the size of naval ships, crawling along on tracks: “It 
had lifted its skirt and displayed along the length of it—feet! They were thick, stumpy feet, 
between knobs and buttons in shape—flat, broad things, reminding one of the feet of 
elephants…as the skirt rose higher, the war correspondent, scrutinizing the thing through his 
glasses again, saw that these feet hung, as it were, on the rims of wheels.”
21
 Though the 
machines he described would have been too large to be of practical use, he did make reference 
to a Pedrail system already available for tractors in Britain, and hinted at the dimensions and 
military application of this type of armored vehicle. Though perceptive and imaginative, Wells was 
not in a position to and had no need to make his fictional design a reality. 
Over the first decade of the twentieth century, there were perfunctory attempts to 
integrate tractor treads or tracks with military vehicles. An experimental tractor, weighing 8 tons, 
was taken on a trial run of 300 miles through the British countryside in the spring of 1910, though 
nothing came of this experiment.
22
 A civil engineer from Australia, Mr. Lance de Mole, submitted 
a design for a cross-country machine to the War Office in 1912, claiming that the use of a track 
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would allow his design to climb over any obstacle. His only reply at the time was that the War 
Office (specifically the Munitions Invention Department) was not then investigating the use of 
tracks or tractors, and his design was not used.
23
 It would not be until the First World War began 
that the need for a military tractor, or an improved armored car, would gain interest among 
audiences untrained in mechanical or engineering departments, and would earn the attention it 
needed for serious experimentation. 
Within only a few months of the beginning of the war, by late 1914, a flurry of activity 
focused on the need for a new mechanical solution to the problems of the war: Lieutenant-
Colonel Stern, recalling the fall of that year, described the interest in armor from multiple sides, 
with Sir Winston Churchill requesting the creation of “landships,” Major Hetherington describing a 
“cross-country armored car,” and a letter to the Prime Minister outlining a need for “special 
mechanical devices for taking trenches.”
24
 Though vague at first, these concepts focused 
primarily on a vehicle that could overcome trenches and move the infantry further forward, 
breaking through the lines established in an earlier battle. The flood of inspiration must have 
certainly been encouraging for early tank designers, especially as armored cars were already 
seeing service in 1914, but this rush of ideas meant that each hopeful inventor had different ideas 
about what exactly their machine would accomplish.  
Beginning with the design of an armored car was a logical start. Armored car divisions 
already existed within the British army, and were capable of delivering men and supplies with 
some speed. However, adding heavier armor to armored cars robbed them of their speedy 
advantage, and with wheels designed for paved roads and lanes, their cross-country capabilities 
were sorely lacking. As First Lord of the Admiralty in 1914, Churchill conceived of an armored 
force that would replicate on land what the British navy had already accomplished at sea: heavy 
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armor that could move through any obstacle, carrying guns to forward positions to strike at enemy 
lines. Tactically, this concept was forward-thinking indeed, but since Churchill belonged to the 
Admiralty and not the War Office, he and his followers were hard-pressed to convince the War 
Office of the value of designing such armored machines. Finally, designs had already been put 
forward for gun-carriers with enormous wheels to cross rivers and wide trenches, but increasing 
the size of the wheel would have only made the machine more vulnerable to artillery fire and the 
design was scrapped. Russia had launched a similar design in 1914, only to find that the weight 
of the wheels made the machine too heavy to move through thick mud.
25
 If designers were 
attempting to develop a stronger armored car, their path to success would have been more 
evident, but because other voices recommended development along the lines of gun carriers or 
naval dreadnoughts, proposed adjustments or refinements did not always follow the same theory 
of design. Even when in a conceptual stage, the actual purpose of the tank was unclear, thus 
making it difficult for early coordinators to decide what features their design should incorporate. 
It was Churchill, with the least concrete plan and the most administrative power, who took 
it upon himself to create a Landships Committee under his administration in the Admiralty, 
bringing on the Director of Naval Construction Eustace d’Eyncourt to help lead the committee and 
oversee its progress.
26
 Again, trials with tractor tracks and cross-country track systems were 
attempted, both in Britain and in France. Without a clear purpose in mind, the Landships 
Committee had difficulty finding a design to use in moving forward: the designs they had were 
intended to carry infantry, but creating machines of a size capable of transporting a viable force 
were too large and unwieldy to be of any use. The Pedrail system, which had been identified by 
H.G. Wells as a viable system for his fictional machines, proved too small to gain the traction 
needed to propel machines of the projected dimensions, and so the committee had to wait as 
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Caterpillar tracks were ordered from America.
27
 In June of 1915, Churchill left the Admiralty, and 
it came to d’Eyncourt to maintain the momentum of the Landships Committee and keep it from 
falling to the wayside.  
At the same time, another current of inspiration came from the War Office, apparently 
unconnected to Churchill’s creation of the Landships Committee. In an odd coincidence, a war 
correspondent much like the main character of “The Land Ironclads” found himself inspired by 
that self-same story as he reported back from G.H.Q. in France, watching as early movement 
developed into the extended actions of slow moving trench warfare. Though a military man in his 
own right, Major Ernest Swinton spent the first year of the war reporting on conditions on the 
Western Front and earning heavy censorship for his effort. In his memoirs, constructed as a 
defense of his claim to title of “inventor of the tank”, Swinton explained that he approached Sir 
Maurice Hankey, the current Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defense, with an idea about 
using American Holt tractors to climb over obstacles on the Western Front. The date given by 
Swinton was October of 1914 (though his letter to Hankey was dated November) meaning that 
his suggestion would have been given well before the formation of the Landships Committee in 
February 1915, but the information given by Swinton about his “idea” was as unclear as the 
Landships Committee’s own theories in the winter of 1914-1915.
28
 Like others, Swinton had 
clearly seen a tractor in motion, and coupled it with his experiences during the first months of 
conflict. However, whether this is enough to credit him as “inventor” is doubtful.  
What is crucial about Swinton’s account is not his technical knowledge of the tank, but his 
connections and initial inspiration. Knowing Hankey personally, Swinton was able to 
communicate this concept of a tractor in warfare directly to a figure with significant influence in 
the War Office rather than the Admiralty. Swinton also had the chance to speak with Lord 
Kitchener himself, Secretary of State of War, but his appointment was cancelled and Swinton 
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returned to France in the winter of 1914 nursing worries that the idea of war tractors would be lost 
due to disinterest.
29
 His duties as war correspondent occupied most of his time in the intervening 
months, but updates from Hankey in early 1915 reassured Swinton that someone was pursuing 
the idea of tractors. The Prime Minister himself was aware of these movements, having been 
petitioned by both Hankey and Churchill, and though Kitchener was unenthusiastic about the 
concept, Hankey kept the idea close at hand even as Swinton returned to France.
30
 Since 
Hankey and Churchill had discussed Swinton’s idea prior to the formation of the Landships 
Committee, Swinton saw the committee’s formation as a result of his own inspiration, later taking 
credit indirectly for Churchill’s work.  
Swinton’s personal influence was certainly important for bringing the tank idea to higher 
ranking members of the War Office, particularly those who could act on the idea and redirect the 
necessary resources to the project. However, simply because the Landships Committee was not 
formed until 1915 does not mean that they lacked the inspiration Swinton claimed. Each man 
involved with the early concepts of the tank had a goal in mind and a role they imagined the tank 
would fulfill. From this standpoint, even H.G. Wells can be included among the various “inventors” 
of the tank, for his outline provided in “The Land Ironclads” demonstrated a knowledge of the 
technical possibilities of the time as well as potential applications for that technology on a field of 
battle. From this mess of committees and correspondence, one thing is clear: the tank had no 
single inventor, and no single individual can claim full responsibility for the tank’s development. 
The technical knowledge required to construct a tank was available even to students with only a 
casual interest in engineering or mechanics, and was accessible enough for Wells to use such 
technical details in a fictional story for public consumption. Swinton presented the best argument 
for having inspired others to pursue research into tank development, but he recorded only brief 
interactions with Hankey and a Captain Tulloch to develop his ideas.
31
 The Landships Committee 
                                                          
29
 Swinton, Eyewitness, 81-82. 
 
30
 Swinton, Eyewitness, 183. 
 
31
 Swinton, Eyewitness, 100. 
 13 
 
was from the start a group of people working towards a functioning design. The extended timeline 
of early tank development also illustrates that inspiration did not come from a single source or a 
single external need, but rather that the tank as a concept was already wholly accessible to 
citizens of the early twentieth century. The investment of the British government was thus the final 
step that made the landships a reality. 
 
 
Early Trials 
The general confusion of purpose did not resolve with the beginning of 1915, nor even 
with the creation of the Landships Committee. The arrival of the Caterpillar tracks allowed the 
Landships Committee to produce some experimental tractors, but as late as June 23
rd
, the full 
roster read only: 
“(1) One Killen-Strait Tractor 
(2) Two Giant Creeper Grip Tractors 
(3) Two Diplock experimental one-ton wagons 
(4) An experimental ground at Burton-on-Trent.”
32
 
Despite this meager count, Stern and d’Eyncourt continued to work diligently at coordinating 
civilian efforts for their own purposes, primarily from Messrs. Fosters and Company of Lincoln.  
As a company with experience in the production of agricultural machines, Fosters and Company 
had the resources and the experience to produce tractors on the scale needed by the Landships 
Committee. To facilitate the design and production, Fosters and Company employee William 
Tritton joined the Landships Committee, and participated in designing the first functional tank. A 
supervisor at Burton-on-Trent was Lieutenant W. Wilson, transferred from the Armored Car 
Squadron, who worked with Tritton.
33
 Churchill left the Admiralty in summer of 1915, but 
fortunately, the new First Lord of the Admiralty saw no reason to interfere with Churchill’s “project” 
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and left the Landships Committee as it was. D’Eyncourt found it necessary to transfer more 
responsibility for the committee to Stern, and an attempt to more fully integrate the committee 
with the War Office, rather than the Admiralty, took place during the early months of 1915. The 
results of this integration were mixed: Swinton and Hankey must not have been aware of the 
committee’s difficulties, or they might have been more proactive about organizing movement 
within the War Office itself to support the landships experiments.  
Stern found that many of his difficulties came from a lack of workable prototypes. Finding 
a workable design that utilized the tracks also proved difficult, though with Tritton and Wilson 
working more closely with Messrs. Fosters and Company, the Caterpillar tracks and the addition 
of guns to prototype models began to see results. It was the inclusion of guns that led most 
authors to identify “Little Willie,” a model produced in August 1915, as the first real tank for its 
inclusion of tracks, armor on all sides, and guns.
34
 
“Little Willie,” and other designs, continued to use wheels and short track systems for 
propulsion, meaning that the tractors developed could only cross trenches less than four feet 
wide—just barely missing the War Office’s figures of four feet six inches. The War Office provided 
this figure only in August of 1915, finally giving the Landships Committee a goal for which to aim, 
and Tritton and Wilson informed Stern that for a machine to cross a gap of that size, they would 
require a ‘wheel’ 60 feet long. “The contour of this sized wheel became more or less the shape of 
the underside of the new machine, which was called first the ‘Wilson’ Machine, then ‘Big Willie’, 
and finally ‘Mother’.”
35
 The wheel discussed was not a singular circular wheel, as in a tractor, but 
referred instead to the length of continuous track which would be used as the machine’s base and 
would give the machine maximum traction against the ground. 
Once Tritton, Wilson, and Stern had a working model, it deserved a name; with the 
naming of “Little Willie”, or the “Tritton” model, it was natural to move simply to “Wilson” and “Big 
Willie” as the next step in naming. The use of Tritton and Wilson’s names for their designs reflects 
                                                          
34
 Stern, Tanks, 1914-1918, 29. 
 
35
 Stern, Tanks, 1914-1918, 31. 
 
 15 
 
their personal investment in their work, and Stern saw nothing out of place in referring to specific 
designs with the names of their inventors. The use of “Little Willie” and “Big Willie” as names may 
have been a joke referring to the German Crown Prince Wilhelm II.
36
 Though Stern does not 
record it, the second model developed was formally christened the H.M.L.S. (His Majesty’s Land-
Ship) Centipede, referencing the track type used.  
However, the most interesting name of the list is “Mother”, especially with a telegram sent 
on September 22
nd
 from Tritton and Wilson to Stern: “New arrival by Tritton out of Pressed Plate. 
Light in weight but very strong. All doing well, thank you. PROUD PARENTS.”
37
 The concept of 
parenthood, or of infancy, was reinforced by Stern in the very next sentence of his record, 
claiming “This was the birth of the tank.” As far as the identities of individuals are present in these 
designs, Tritton and Wilson take pride of place, adopting not merely an engineer’s interest in their 
work but a paternal investment in their “child”. What Swinton claimed through his evidence of 
letters and communications, Tritton and Wilson assumed merely in the language they used: the 
functioning tank prototypes were theirs, and they had a responsibility to develop those prototypes 
into products capable of working effectively on the Western Front.  
As developments took place on the fields of Burton-on-Trent, the War Office was also 
realizing the need to more fully adopt the Landships Committee as a genuine war effort. No 
longer sidelined as “Churchill’s project”, the men of the Landships Committee began to hear more 
regularly from the Munitions Inventions Department. Stern and Swinton finally met in person and 
recognized the extent of each other’s efforts, shocked that the miscommunication between the 
Admiralty and the War Office had allowed the Landships Committee to flounder on its own for so 
long. Swinton was grateful that Stern (and the committee as a whole) had been able to pursue 
their prototypes and experiments even while Hankey and Kitchener debated the value of tractors; 
Stern was grateful to learn that someone in the War Office, with connections among the very 
highest levels of administration, had already promoted the idea of tractors on the Western Front 
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and was working toward the same goals espoused by the Landships Committee. In their meeting, 
Stern remembered Swinton commenting on the absurdity of their situation: 
“Lieutenant Stern, this is the most extraordinary thing that I have ever seen. The 
Director of Naval Construction (d’Eyncourt) appears to be making land 
battleships for the Army who have never asked for them, and are doing nothing 
to help. You have nothing but naval ratings doing all your work. What on earth 
are you? Are you a mechanic or a chauffeur?”
38
 
Without clear leadership or specific direction, the Landships Committee was mired in 
confusion, leaving much of its early efforts unappreciated by the War Office or by the 
British Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.).  
Once communication was more clearly established, the murkiness of tank production and 
development began to clear somewhat. However, Stern would continue to be frustrated by the 
input of others, particularly those who had not shared his earlier efforts or understood his vision 
for the tanks. One observer, watching the tank trials during September of 1915, disapproved of 
the measure and “viewed with dismay the fact that the War Office, the Committee of Imperial 
Defense and the Admiralty were all mixed up in deciding this question.”
39
 The lack of significant 
progress through 1915 was as disappointing for outside observers as it was for Stern himself, and 
the need for secrecy hampered the flow of information. Workmen at the Messrs. And Fosters 
Company were sworn to secrecy when working on tank prototypes, yet they complained of abuse 
from their comrades for not doing “war work.”
40
 Thus, in the face of engineering difficulties, the 
doubt of other administrators, and the mire of red tape, Stern found himself bullying the War 
Badge Department for something to pass along to the Fosters workmen. Never mind that the 
tanks had not even yet seen battle, or been given crews: as mere prototypes, they formed for 
Stern a nightmare of logistics and repeated reassurances for everyone involved. 
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Though exhausted, Stern nonetheless found his work worth the effort, especially when 
machine guns were installed in the “Mother” prototype and fired successfully. As Stern monitored 
the technical progress, Swinton left the position of war correspondent and returned to England, 
giving him the opportunity to situate himself in the War Office and more fervently advance the 
cause of the tanks. Swinton was gratified to find that Churchill had continued to submit 
memoranda about how armor should be utilized on the Western Front and did much of the 
bureaucratic legwork in ensuring that the Landships Committee received the attention it 
deserved. An interdepartmental conference finally took place on December 24
th
 1915 which 
confirmed that the tank concept should be in the hands of the Army and the War Office, not the 
Admiralty.
41
 However, not much else was certain: the Admiralty could supply the guns for new 
tanks, but refused to take on the burden of producing the machines themselves, while the 
Ministry of Munitions also refused the duty. Finally, it was realized that a new committee would 
need to be created by the War Office to oversee the production of tanks and their continued trials, 
beginning with an order for fifty machines.
42
  
Swinton also recounted the process of devising the name of “tank”, since the committee 
had called the machines “landships” (or occasionally “Caterpillars”) up to this date. Secrecy 
required that the new committee lose the title “Landships Committee”, since the name itself might 
give away too much of the secret of the machines, and so Swinton took it upon himself to find a 
better pseudonym for their work. 
The structure of the machine in its early stages being boxlike, some term 
conveying the idea of a box or container seemed appropriate. We rejected in 
turn—‘container’—‘receptacle’—‘reservoir’—‘cistern’. The monosyllable ‘tank’ 
appealed to us as being likely to catch on and be remembered. That night, in the 
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draft report of the conference, the word ‘tank’ was employed in its new sense for 
the first time.
43
 
Who better than a war correspondent to create a new meaning for a word merely on his own 
invention? Swinton brought to the conference his flair for the dramatic which echoes throughout 
his writing, and his decision to use ‘tank’ has been proved effective over the intervening century.  
Swinton made no mention of the other secrecy measures taken to obscure the purpose 
of the tanks, but the attention given to secrecy certainly indicates how important the tanks were 
understood to be. Airplanes were prevented from flying over the tank testing grounds, and Cyrillic 
characters were painted on tank parts as they were shipped across England to substantiate a 
rumor that the Russians had ordered new water tanks.
44
 The Landships Committee thus 
managed to work just outside the normal limits of public knowledge or attention, using diversion 
rather than denial to explain the odd prototypes being developed. 
Swinton’s investment in the tanks at this time illustrates how the concept of the tank had 
become more than a mere technical amusement in his mind. His fear that his name would be 
overlooked prompted him to justify his claim to inventing the tank and to involve himself with tank 
administration as frequently as possible. . A justified fear, perhaps, but slightly out of line with his 
actual contributions. Stern had the stronger investment in the tanks, given his position on the 
Landships Committee, but never went so far as to claim he invented the tank. Instead, his 
personal pride was more at risk when the committee was ignored or when their early prototypes 
failed. The allure of mechanical warfare drew interested men to the Landships Committee, like 
Stern and Swinton, but once involved in the personal politics of administration, those men found 
additional reasons to justify their connection and claim to the early tanks. 
 
Deployment 
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1916 was an especially strong year for the tanks. With their organizational place more 
firmly located in the War Office, and no longer adrift with the Admiralty, the new Tank Supply 
Committee was reassured of the attention of higher commanders, and they earned the 
begrudging approval of Lord Kitchener himself at the conference on December 24
th
. Churchill’s 
memoranda had found their way through France and into the hands of Sir Douglas Haig, who 
took over from Sir John French as Commander of the British Expeditionary Force in the early 
months of 1916. His decision to send an officer to investigate Churchill’s references to 
“Caterpillars” meant that it was Lieutenant-Colonel Hugh Elles who came to England to make his 
enquiries, fating him to later step into a command position in the fledgling Tank Corps.
45
  
Haig’s attention to the early tanks was important for their development, for it was partially 
because of his attention that recruitment and organization for tank crews began in March 1916. 
Based on optimistic projections of tank production, tank companies were recruited from the Motor 
Machine Gun Corps, choosing men who had worked with armored cars and machine guns 
already.
46
 The engineers, designers, and tacticians who had concerned themselves with the 
tanks for so long had staked their own reputations on the utility of tanks, but now it was a new 
audience who would be required to put these plans into action. So many tacticians had 
emphasized the requirement that the tank climb over obstacles on a field, but the inclusion of 
guns added a new factor that no training manual addressed: the tank crews needed to be trained 
in the use of their guns, working as gunners as much as mechanics. The requirements of a crew 
also forced some observers to realize that a tank crew could not merely be thrown into a tank 
without some introduction; tank crews needed to train together in order to develop teamwork and 
quick communication skills. Though manuals were designed and presented to tank crews, no 
amount of reading or studying was sufficient substitute for sitting in a real, functioning tank and 
practicing at the controls. As Major Williams-Ellis described it, “No one had sat down to imagine a 
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Tank in action from within.”
47
 Having passed from test to trial and from design to deployment, the 
physical tanks made different demands of their new crews than they had of their early champions.  
Sir Douglas Haig’s interest in the tanks was an important step in the transition from War 
Office project to battlefield reality for the tanks: with his approval, the early tanks were not only 
approved for use, but were eagerly welcomed. This welcome was a relief for men on the Tank 
Supply Committee, since it retroactively gave credence to their hard work, but Haig’s eager 
welcome quickly translated into unrealistic optimism. Swinton and Stern, though not always 
working in tandem, were sure of one thing: there were not enough tanks either in service or being 
produced to be used effectively before the end of 1916. Focused on coordinating the production 
of the tanks, Stern found it hard to imagine supplying the B.E.F. with sufficient numbers of tanks 
when Haig requested them early in 1916. With tank crews still forced to practice with mock-ups, 
lacking the real tanks to practice driving and maneuvering, any force sent to France would be 
woefully under-supplied and lacking vital training. Simply placing the tank on the battlefield would 
not be enough to make a difference in an offensive, and neither would placing an untrained crew 
in a tank be effective. Stern and Swinton sought to create a fully outfitted force, with crew well-
trained in their duties, and prepared to meet the challenges of the new tanks. What made its way 
to the Somme battlefield in July of 1916 was not this force. 
In Haig’s view, having a partially-functioning tank was better than having no tank at all, 
and so it was that he sent a force of less than 50 tanks into battle at Flers-Courcelette. Swinton 
found this move absurd, while Stern was similarly uncertain of the idea, yet Haig’s decision gave 
the tanks a chance to perform under actual battle conditions and emerge with a small—though 
eventually insignificant—victory.  
In 1916, as Colonel Hugh Elles assumed command of the tank crews organized under 
the Machine Gun Corps Heavy Branch, other professional soldiers joined their ranks to help 
direct the crews. One of the key figures—perhaps the primary figure—in detailing the tank’s 
tactical role and fighting for its adoption on a large scale was Major J.F.C. Fuller, a veteran of the 
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Second Boer War. While in South Africa, Fuller began his work in writing training pamphlets and 
tactical papers, an occupation that he maintained throughout his relocations from South Africa to 
India and his return to England in the years precluding the First World War. His military ranks 
were mostly unimpressive, and through 1914 and 15, Fuller worked mainly as a Railway 
Transport Officer helping to send other soldiers to France. However, when information about the 
tanks reached Fuller in August 1916, Fuller obtained permission to see the tanks in person, 
where they captured his imagination. After being recommended for the position by a captain in 
the Heavy Branch, Fuller joined the Heavy Branch in December 1916 as a staff officer under 
Elles.
48
 
As a tactician, Fuller claimed and largely deserved much of the credit for developing tank 
tactics throughout the First World War. Though men like Stern or Swinton took credit for the initial 
development of the tank, Fuller’s appointment left Swinton far out of his depth in tactical matters, 
and Fuller took on the responsibility not merely of administrating the incipient Tank Corps, but of 
devising and refining tactical doctrine for use on the battlefield. 
Fuller’s understanding of his position was laden with the pride of his appointment and his 
own self-confidence. The tanks quickly became much more than a mere development in warfare: 
they dominated Fuller’s tactical thinking and his perception of the B.E.F.. The difficulty in 
accepting Fuller’s presentation is that Fuller was a single voice claiming the tanks as masterful 
weapons. In contrast to Haig, the man Fuller used most often as a foil to his own understanding 
of tank utility, Fuller believed the tanks would immediately return the war to a mobile conflict, 
while Haig’s initial enthusiasm for the tanks relied on their short-term potential for providing 
armor.  Fuller’s focus led him to make grandiose claims about the potential of the tanks, while that 
potential was unreachable so long as the B.E.F. had to manage infantry, artillery, cavalry, and 
political concerns in the midst of a brutal conflict. Fuller’s claims about tanks could have been 
realized—Fuller was no idiot, and most of his assumptions were founded in fact—but the tanks 
were far less of a concern for the B.E.F. and its generals than were the immediate issues of the 
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war. In understanding Fuller’s perspective, one must be careful not to accept Fuller’s caricature of 
Haig as slow-witted or belligerently stupid. 
That Haig was stubborn is not in question: Haig could be defiantly stubborn, especially in 
the face of what he assumed to be interference in his work, but he was hardly unique for having 
this trait. Though he originally wrote high praise of the tanks and encouraged their use, their 
presence on the battlefield failed to impress him, and he soon lost his excitement for tanks and 
refocused his efforts on artillery and infantry efforts. Haig’s apparent vacillation on his opinion of 
tanks should not be read as an indication of a man who could not make up his mind, but instead 
reflects the grim truth of the practicality of tanks when they were still untested and relatively new. 
Haig was capable of understanding the tactical advantages of tanks, as indicated by his initial 
interest, but when their meager numbers proved insufficient to radically change the outcome of 
battle, Haig returned his attention to other more pressing matters. Haig’s position as general of 
the B.E.F. should be enough to remind us of his many responsibilities. Fuller’s attention to a 
single, underdeveloped branch could hardly be replicated by a general coordinating battalions 
across nearly 400 miles of front.  
Like some of his fellow tank men at the company or battalion level, Fuller recognized the 
need for a spirit of cooperation among new tank recruits, and also decried the methods of 
recruitment that had assembled such a “band of brigands”
49
 from among the B.E.F. to supply the 
new tank battalions. Here, Commander Watson and Commander Hickey’s accounts give more 
insight as to the daily routine of establishing drills and running practice assaults, and Fuller’s 
concern remained at an administrative level. He did give personal speeches to each company, 
which he thought very effective, but he was equally concerned with the creation of a corps badge, 
declaring battalion colors, and having the name officially changed to the “Tank Corps.”
50
 In these 
goals, he acted with the support of his commander, Colonel Elles. Even more so than Stern and 
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Swinton, Elles and Fuller recognized that it would be the cohesion of tank crews, not merely the 
technical advantages of the tanks, that would give the tanks a better chance at success. 
While the individual accounts of tank men gave hints of their confusion or frustration with 
the organization of the early tank battalions, Fuller’s perspective spoke to the reality underlying 
this confusion. Fuller blamed the lack of a true tank representative on the GHQ staff as the key 
reason behind the Tank Corps’ instability: without a single representative or agent with whom to 
communicate, the Tank Corps were left to go from department to department, requesting 
armament from one, transportation from another, and personnel from yet another. The small size 
of the tank crews was a simple result of a lack of tanks, but their size also prevented them from 
receiving the attention they deserved (or that Fuller believed they deserved). Fuller mentioned 
Stern by name, identifying him not as a hindrance to the goals of the Tank Corps but using him as 
an example to illustrate how the Home Office and production goals of the tank men in Britain 
could stand at odds to the realistic needs of the Tank Corps.
51
 Stern, in connection with Wilson 
and Tritton, was focused on creating a better tank model and running further experiments with 
experimental models to produce the best design. In contrast, by the end of 1916 Fuller and Elles 
were more concerned with having enough tanks to train and organize effectively, while Stern 
continued to try and devise modifications for updating the current tank design. Totally separate 
from their actual performance in their few minor battles, the tanks and their crews were subject to 
the persistent tensions of supply and demand throughout 1916. Without a larger number of tanks, 
Fuller determined, the Tank Corps would never prove their efficacy as a fighting force. However, 
without proving the efficacy of the tanks as a weapon, the Tank Corps risked having their supplies 
and tank production reduced, since the current models could be seen as ineffective.
52
 
By the Battle of Arras in the spring of 1917, Fuller was detailing the problems with the 
contemporary British approach to warfare. For tanks to make a successful attack, the ground had 
to be stable and mostly undestroyed, meaning that the preliminary artillery barrages common on 
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the Western Front did more to hinder the tanks than provide serious cover. However, it was the 
Battle of Bullecourt later that year where Fuller’s real tactical imagination was inspired, and he 
described an impassioned response to the reports from Bullecourt. On a practical level, the battle 
itself was a failure. However, because there had been only a limited artillery barrage, Fuller saw 
the embodiment of his earlier ideas from Arras: tanks could perform, and could potentially 
perform better, when the artillery provided little to no preliminary bombardment. Furthermore, the 
ability of the tanks to coordinate with infantry indicated the real benefits of having the two arms 
work together, the tanks as an offensive “spike” to push into the enemy lines and the infantry as 
an occupying force to follow behind and fill the enemy trenches.
53
 Since artillery had, for much of 
the war, been considered the offensive weapon to puncture enemy lines, this shift towards 
replacing the artillery bombardment with tank maneuvers was a promising change for the Tank 
Corps. Fuller continued to cite the need for more tanks, arguing that had there been four times 
the number of tanks available at Bullecourt, the losses might have been victories.
54
  
Fuller’s constant struggle was against what he perceived to be the obstinacy, stupidity, or 
mere idiocy of General Headquarters. Not always were the problems of the Tank Corps the fault 
of Douglas Haig himself, but Fuller did not hesitate to reach for the general as an example of 
GHQ’s stubbornness. An examination of Haig’s records shows little of the stupidity or obstinacy 
which Fuller found so aggravating. It was, of course, unlikely that Haig himself would record his 
own failings, especially in journals he later intended to publish. Instead, the picture given 
regarding the tanks was one much more favorable in tone, as Haig’s first conversation with 
Colonel Ernest Swinton indicated not only an appreciation of tanks, but a desire for them to be 
produced and deployed as soon as possible. This note was made in April of 1916, as Haig was 
preparing for the First Battle of the Somme; by August, Haig was still waiting for the tanks to 
arrive, as per correspondence from Swinton. The entries for 15 September and 17 September 
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described the notable tank actions of the 15
th
 and included a personal note of congratulations to 
Colonel Swinton.
55
 
Fuller, in correspondence with other tank men and discussions at the Tank Headquarters 
in France at Bermicourt, continued to develop and consider various forms of tank tactics. In the 
aftermath of Bullecourt, Fuller’s next big item of interest was a paper entitled “A Tank Army” 
written by Chief Staff Officer Martel, in which Martel speculated about the formation of an army 
built only of tanks, with different tanks fulfilling different roles.
56
 Again, this kind of speculation was 
too remote to be of practical use to tank crews on the ground but beginning in 1917 and coming 
to light in 1918, the development of alternate tank models would begin to realize some of Martel’s 
thinking.  
 
Ups And Downs Of 1917 
The slog of bureaucracy seemed to Fuller the greatest challenge to the Tank Corps, 
especially since the opinion of General Douglas Haig seemed to rely upon whether the Tank 
Corps would require a diversion of resources away from infantry divisions. The winter of 1916-17 
saw the growth of the Tank Corps, to Fuller’s relief, but his relief was short-lived, since the 
acquisition of new recruits meant that tank tactics would have to be taught to yet another group of 
officers. The addition of more battalions was also a welcome boon to the Tank Corps, yet again, 
the necessity of coordinating tank movements with infantry and artillery decisions proved 
frustrating. Fuller eventually would write a paper planning the use of tank tactics in 1918 in which 
he made one of the strongest arguments for mechanization, claiming that since mechanical 
power would quickly replace muscular power, it was vital that the tacticians along the Western 
Front began to choose their offensive locations to best favor the tanks. Fuller’s formula was 
seemingly simple: the ground chosen must be “(1) Suitable for the rapid movement of tanks. (2) 
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Unsuitable for anti-tank defenses.”
57
 Though it is unclear whether Fuller’s paper was ever read by 
anyone outside of the Tank Corps, his bold stance on behalf of the tanks is striking. Fuller 
essentially demanded a reconfiguration of British tactics based solely around the existence of the 
tank. Even with a few minor disclaimers about retaining infantry—“it is the infantry-man with his 
machine gun and bayonet who is going to decide the battle”
58
—Fuller sought to replace the role 
of artillery with the tanks, challenging the established pattern of battle used to that point in the 
war.  
While Fuller was pleased to compose and share his tactical ideas with other tank men, 
there was the harsh disillusionment of reality which presented the more pressing concern. The 
offensive at Passchendaele, recorded as the Battle of Passchendaele or the Third Battle of 
Ypres, seemed to be a step backwards for the tanks. Fuller and the other Tank Corps staff 
considered the plans for battle to be “none other than a repetition of the Somme tactics on a 
floating bog;”
59
 not only was the outline of the offensive practically identical to the attack on the 
Somme, but there was no explicit role for tanks to play, meaning that they would be again 
relegated to a supporting arm of the infantry. Whether Fuller’s pride was wounded because of this 
apparent slight to the tanks or because it was clear that Haig and GHQ were refusing to consider 
Fuller’s tactical input is uncertain. However, Fuller’s reception to the orders given for the offensive 
at Passchendaele was negative from the outset, even before the battle itself revealed the 
shortcomings of the tanks.  
Life on the battlefield was difficult, and the tank crews had to adapt to their unfortunate 
surroundings while also combatting their tanks’ natural tendency to sink into mud. However, the 
fact that Fuller, Elles, and most of the Tank Corps staff had accurately predicted the failure of the 
tanks at Passchendaele points to the lack of proper communication and lack of tactical 
understanding between Tank Corps staff and the staff of the rest of the British Expeditionary 
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Force. Fuller and others had clearly developed a variety of tank tactics that outlined the ideal 
conditions for using the tanks, and though they sometimes mimicked Swinton and Stern in 
making overly-optimistic predictions, GHQ’s inability or refusal to adapt their tactics for tanks 
meant that the tanks were at a severe disadvantage.  
To an extent, Fuller’s complaints mirrored those of other pessimistic observers at the 
Western Front. GHQ often seemed to be at a distance from the actual fighting, ignorant of the 
conditions at the front, and the myth of “donkeys directing lions” grew in popularity as historians 
and non-historians alike identified commanders in the First World War as disconnected from or 
ignorant of costly realities.
60
 Haig in particular has been a widely contested figure in First World 
War historiography, with his intelligence repeatedly questioned and the efficacy of his methods 
debated.
61
 However, Fuller’s presentation took a different tone because of the existence of the 
tanks. Fuller had devoted time and energy to developing new tactics, not merely to adjust to a 
still-shifting battlefield but to adapt to an entirely new weapon altogether. His propositions were 
radical, pushing defiantly against the artillery barrages that were the pride of the B.E.F. He staked 
his reputation on the tanks not only as they performed in reality, but on their potential successes, 
pointing repeatedly to the various reasons why tanks were not as effective as they could be. By 
trying to bridge the gap between concept and reality, Fuller found that not every officer or 
administrator had the same vision for the tanks as he did. Those who shared his vision earned his 
praise, as Swinton did; those who apparently lacked his vision, or saw alternate uses for the 
tanks, earned his scornful derision.  
Even at Cambrai in the summer of 1917, Fuller found the glory of victory marred by 
changes made to his tactical plans. In the preparation for the battle, Fuller and Elles seemed to 
agree that the battle itself was “custom made” for tanks, having taken into consideration the 
various complaints made by the tank men at Passchendaele and Bullecourt. The ground was 
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mostly level and unshelled, meaning that tanks could reach their top speeds. The newer model 
Mark IV tanks had arrived in force, giving tank crews time to train and adjust to their new tanks, 
and Fuller proudly noted that the tank crews were no longer entirely novices, having had most of 
the year 1917 to train. For the tanks, the battle came at an ideal time, and the tank tacticians 
seemed to finally be receiving the credit they were due. Though there was still resistance to the 
tanks among some infantry commanders, this resistance did not prevent the tanks from 
performing as planned at Cambrai—though Fuller still found opportunity to complain about the 
lack of support.  
Fuller also found fault with the plans for the Battle of Cambrai, despite the fact that some 
of his earlier tactics were finally being put to use. The battle plans called for a commitment of 
nearly all the available tanks in the Tank Corps, which satisfied the calls of Swinton and Stern in 
earlier battles to use all available tanks for maximum impact, but Fuller adopted a position of 
shock and annoyance that so few tanks were being kept in reserve. With so many tanks in action 
at once, Fuller predicted that the reserves were too small to allow tanks to press their initial 
advantage: as tanks broke down or were destroyed by the enemy, there would be insufficient 
reserve power to properly capitalize on any tank success. The commitment of tanks was a far cry 
from the “penny packets” from earlier in the war, but Fuller was so perturbed that he 
characterized the plans as “not a work of art, but a work of force—not the thrust of a rapier but the 
blow of a battery ram.  … A greater act of folly it would be difficult to imagine.”
62
 This shift in 
understanding the needs and limitations of tanks was partly thanks to Fuller’s own experience, in 
contrast to Swinton’s relative lack of experience, but Fuller was also privileged enough to work 
with a Tank Corps that had seen action and grown substantially in size. All the same, given the 
victory at Cambrai and the importance it would continue to hold for the young Tank Corps, 
Fuller’s complaints were short-sighted, focused too much on his own personal contributions and 
tactics rather than the full dimensions of an army. 
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It was also at Cambrai that Fuller began to turn his attention towards the cavalry. At first, 
his complaints focused on their system of organization: the battle plan for Cambrai called for the 
general of the cavalry to remain several miles away from the front lines, meaning that 
developments would have to be relayed back to him before he could issue orders. In line with 
Fuller’s earlier observation about speed versus power, Fuller found this system of relays and 
delays infuriating, since it would rob one of their most dynamic arms of its primary advantage. If 
the battle relied on speed, in his calculations, then crippling the cavalry in this way would ensure 
that they never saw action. This later informed his judgment of the cavalry as an arm doomed to 
obsolescence, though he attempted to soften the blow by claiming it was simply by the decision 
of this general that the cavalry was edged out of action. However, it is no accident that Fuller 
ended a chapter of his memoir by describing the failure and doom of the cavalry before 
immediately titling the next chapter “Knights in Armor”—referring not to the cavalry, but to his own 
men in their tanks.
63
 In Fuller’s mind, the transition from cavalry to tanks was a result both of the 
advantages of armor provided by the tanks and of the improved tactics that tank men (including 
himself) offered to a modern army. Here, as in many places in Fuller’s memoir, there were 
general references to the attitude of a Staff College populated by old, aging soldiers with no 
practical knowledge of war, with whom Fuller contrasted himself and other tank staff to validate 
the tank staff’s own tactical decisions.
64
 
In contrast to Fuller’s focus on tactical details, General Hugh Elles gave the impression of 
a cavalier soldier in facing Cambrai. As the commander of the Tank Corps in total, Elles had 
administrative authority over Fuller and the other major generals but preferred to leave the 
detailed discussions of tactics or military intelligence to Fuller and other members of the Tank 
Corps staff. Elles’ understanding of tactics took a lesser position in relation to his concern for the 
men of the Tank Corps, and his special order given on the evening before the battle remains a 
key note in Tank Corps history for its personal impact, not its tactical strengths. In the order, Elles 
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gave some outlines of tactics, but emphasized his expectations for the assault, and most 
importantly—in a single sentence at the end of the order—informed the men of the Tank Corps 
that he would be leading the charge as part of H Battalion, commanding their lead tank.
65
 Fuller 
and other Tank Corps staff rightly saw this move as foolhardy, for if “were we to lose Elles, our 
leadership would be headless,”
66
 and warned Elles away from such a dramatic course of action. 
However, Elles never backed down, and Fuller was forced to admit that this inspiring move 
bolstered the courage and morale of the Tank Corps more effectively than any rousing speech or 
parade. Elles continually demonstrated an understanding of the morale of the tank crews that 
Fuller lacked in real depth. Though Fuller knew the value of training and understood the need to 
create a sense of brotherhood within the corps, his focus on tactics left him little opportunity to 
understand the personal needs of the tank crews.  Elles’s position meant that he was more often 
visible to the men, while administrators like Fuller, Hotblack, and Uzelli were only visible on rare 
occasions, and it was Elles who understood and responded to the tensions within the crews 
themselves. Elles’s decision to ride with the tanks at Cambrai remained a dramatic note in the 
battle for a number of tank men, lending a deeply personal and emotional aspect to the battle. 
Cambrai’s place as a day of glory for the Tank Corps cannot be overstated—the Royal 
Tank Regiment continues to memorialize the 20
th
 of November every year, and the battle of 
Cambrai stands out most vividly in the memories and memoirs of tank men of every stripe. 
Fuller’s concern with tactics, however, continued to tweak the narrative of an overwhelming 
victory.  The tanks took each point required by their orders and thus pushed the British line 
forward by several hundred meters, and with a far lower rate of casualties or losses than 
equivalent battles at the Somme or Passchendaele. However, the lack of reserve tanks prevented 
a thorough exploitation of their advance. Fuller claimed that had the Battle of Cambrai been 
classified as a “raid”, not a full offensive, the lack of momentum would not have been so 
surprising, yet because the efficacy of the tanks was limited to their first major movement, the 
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grand plans for a huge offensive fizzled. Without continuous forward momentum, the impact of 
this tank battle was limited to the dramatic advance of only two days and was insufficient to 
restore the war to a fully mobile conflict. 
Though his critiques had merit, Fuller lacked the grace to acknowledge the progress the 
tanks had made. Based on the experiences of 1916, tanks needed to be deployed in large 
numbers, with enough surprise and minimal artillery barrage to sufficiently overwhelm the enemy. 
The ability to repair tanks and keep them functioning had partially helped keep the number of 
tanks available high, but the decision to commit nearly 500 tanks at Cambrai was certainly 
influenced by these lessons of earlier years. Even as GHQ seemed to be learning from earlier 
mistakes, Fuller saw further flaws in their plan, claiming that more reserves were necessary to 
sufficiently follow the offensive forward. After Cambrai, the question of supply also became more 
pressing for Fuller. A meeting in England, which involved not only Fuller and the Tank Corps staff 
but also included an admiral of the navy, a representative of the USA Army, and Winston 
Churchill, prompted the proposal of reducing the production of shells in order to produce more 
tanks.
67
 Similarly, Fuller accused Haig of being too afraid to reduce infantry numbers to send 
more men to the Tank Corps, which would have enabled them to grow in size and create the 
reserves that Fuller had so wanted during Cambrai.  
In many ways, Fuller was the administrative heir of men like Swinton, who had first begun 
outlining tank tactics before the first battalion ever reached France, but because Fuller lacked the 
perspective of Swinton’s early efforts, he was less appreciative of the slow, subtle changes in 
GHQ thinking. Understanding Fuller’s perspective as a tank staff officer is vital, due to his tactical 
understanding and approach to tank warfare, but his biases must also be understood in order to 
combat his incessant devaluation of non-tank commanders.  
Though Fuller described Haig repeatedly, almost painfully often, Haig never mentioned or 
referenced Fuller. This was partially due to the difference between Haig’s position and Fuller’s: 
General Hugh Elles, Fuller’s superior, was noted by name in Haig’s record, while other staff 
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members in the Tank Corps were not. Haig’s concern with infantry, and the fact that in 1917 tank 
battalions were still subservient to infantry commanders, meant that though Haig did encounter 
tanks and continued to express his praise for them, they only acted as accessories to infantry 
movement.
68
 This matched Fuller’s evaluation of the status of the tanks through 1916 and 1917, 
but while Haig was content to accept this assignment of roles, Fuller evidently felt the tanks had 
more potential than mere accessories.  
Perhaps the most disappointing absence in Haig’s records is the lack of emphasis on the 
Battle of Cambrai in November 1917. Haig made note of the battle, in his usual detail, but the 
tanks remained a side issue, only noted in terms of their numbers and locations. None of the 
glory afforded to the tank crews nor the brilliant successes observed by Elles and Fuller factored 
into Haig’s records, and it was only in conversation with Elles on 3
rd
 December that Haig made 
note of how well the tanks had performed—and even then, he equated their counter-attack on 
30
th
 November with their actions earlier in the month.
69
 In this most dramatic instance, Haig’s 
understanding of the tanks was limited to their numbers, ignoring the larger importance of their 
coordination with infantry and their ability to pursue the enemy so far past their lines.  
Where Haig’s understanding did reflect Fuller’s concerns was in the need for training. 
Contrary to Fuller’s reports, claiming that Haig was reluctant to staff the Tank Corps as he felt 
‘threatened’ by their presence, Haig’s conversation with Elles in December 1917 indicated that 
Haig was well aware of the need for more tank men, and of the need to train them sufficiently.
70
 
There are no details of how Haig valued the importance of recruiting tank men, or how he 
planned to find more recruits, but he was not as ignorant as Fuller might have claimed. By the fall 
of 1917, Haig was trying to balance the needs of the tanks with the multiple other demands of the 
Western Front, leading him to send a letter to the War Office dictating: “No additional personnel 
beyond the number required to man such Tanks as are now in France, and those which can be 
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completed by the 30
th
 September should be allocated for this purpose, and  all transfers to the 
Tank Corps now under consideration should be postponed.” Additionally, “the manufacture of 
Tanks should not be allowed to interfere in any way with (i) the output of aeroplanes. (ii) the 
output of guns and ammunition. (iii) the provision of mechanical transport, spare parts therefor, 
and petro tractors up the scale demanded. (iv) the provision of locomotives for railways up to the 
number asked for.”
71
 
The tanks had their place, but in Haig’s understanding of the battlefield, potential returns 
were not enough to convince him to redirect supplies and personnel to a branch that still 
presented only minor advantages. Fuller’s predictions were promising, but without real results, 
Haig was unconvinced. The tanks could not compete with airplanes, artillery, or even “mechanical 
transport” like the armored cars. Tanks were their own device, which allowed their designers to 
focus on their role as an offensive weapon, but their inability to serve in other roles made them a 
lower priority in Haig’s evaluation. 
 
Advances in 1918 
As the war entered the year 1918, Fuller’s memoirs lost any reference to the tank crews 
and their experiences in the early Tank Corps, and instead focused even more closely on his 
tactical perspectives. His earlier speeches and recollections of training new recruits were lost 
within the rush to produce more tactical papers and arguing for more tanks in an atmosphere 
apparently prejudiced against the tanks. His arguments returned to familiar themes: producing 
more tanks would save more lives, meaning that a simple investment in tanks now would end the 
war more quickly and prevent further losses (both physical and financial) from draining the British 
war economy. Fuller and Elles also seemed to agree that “every effort should be made to 
supplement the man-power at our disposal by machine-power:”
72
 the infantry was not entirely 
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useless, but for Fuller, the tanks were becoming an irreplaceable supplement for the infantry. His 
awareness of larger movements within the British Army was no longer limited to sniping at Haig 
or bemoaning the blindness of GHQ, but instead, he turned his efforts to arguing along the same 
lines as other tacticians.  
The plan for 1918 was for the B.E.F. to adopt a defensive position and hold out on the 
Western Front until American armies arrived,
73
 prompting Fuller to develop arguments against 
this proposition as both a tactician and as an invested Tank Corps staff officer. First, he argued 
that the Germans would attempt to end the war before the United States of America could commit 
to the war. This prediction would prove correct as Russia withdrew from the war and allowed the 
German army to redirect more manpower from the Eastern Front to the Western Front. With a 
renewed German offensive, the British army would have to fight just to maintain its defensive 
positions, while a more offensive approach might allow the British to choose the location of their 
advances and ensure that the Germans did not advance further. 
Second, Fuller believed the tanks would suffer if forced into defensive positions. In his 
words, “passive defense for tanks was an absurdity,”
74
 and the tanks performed best in offensive 
maneuvers, not in fights to hold their ground or retreat. The utility of the tanks came from their 
mobility and their guns, but these advantages would be lost if the tanks were taken by surprise or 
forced to rush into action on ground unsuitable for them. Defense with the tanks was possible, but 
only as a series of offensive raids, exhausting an enemy’s advance before he penetrated the line 
fully.  
Third, with an argument even more focused on the tanks and their production, Fuller 
claimed that the Germans were still unprepared to defend fully against tanks, meaning that a 
strong offensive as soon as possible would enable the tanks to make their maximum impact 
before the Germans devised anti-tank measures. This claim is somewhat disingenuous: the 
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German army had already begun to enact anti-tank measures as early as Bullecourt, and had 
captured British tanks, but Fuller’s immediate concern was the rumor that Germany was at work 
designing its own tanks.
75
 In contrast to his first point, this was the concern that was least well-
founded, as the German tanks deployed in the First World War saw minimal action and proved 
less effective against the British tanks than shelling. The real impact was seen from anti-tank 
rifles, which used armor-piercing rounds to penetrate the tanks, and it was the battle of Cambrai 
that prompted German designers to invest more thoroughly in specific anti-tank weapons.
76
 Even 
these developments had minimal effect, and the real challenge that Fuller chose not to address 
was the fact that tanks still had more to fear from artillery than from specific anti-tank weapons. 
Either by conveniently ignoring the threat of artillery, or by mere ignorance of its existence, 
Fuller’s arguments regarding German anti-tank measures focused on possible retaliations rather 
than the existing problems and did little to propose solutions to the existing obstacles. With an 
impressive level of detail, Fuller’s arguments predicted and outlined a well-developed system of 
tank warfare, but his repetitive missives to GHQ and his eternal frustration reflected his 
pessimistic premonition that his arguments would never be fully considered.  
As the war progressed into 1918, Fuller began to expand his tactical papers to more fully 
include infantry, artillery, and airplanes, outlining a system by which these three groups would 
work with tanks in order to occupy the enemy and wear down his reserves.
77
 His writing also 
began to turn more political and strident in tone, pointing to a British citizenry disillusioned with 
the war and angered by delays. To Fuller, if GHQ would only accept his tactics and agree to the 
increased production of tanks then the war could be concluded and the populace satisfied. 
Mechanical warfare, which was defined by the tanks, would solve every problem if only GHQ 
would allow it. In a dramatic analogy (and one of Fuller’s few references to religion in his personal 
biography), Fuller compared the abilities of the tanks and the reaction of the GHQ officers: 
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This morning reminded me of the heathen gods descending from Olympus to watch the 
advent of Christianity. What they saw was so superior to anything they could do, that they 
at once realized there was no place for them in the new order, so they went back to their 
cloud-home determined to destroy it.
78
 
Fuller’s consideration of airplanes is worthy of note because of similarities and 
differences between the tanks and the airplanes used during the war. Airplanes saw use in the 
First World War originally as reconnaissance machines, equipped with cameras to photograph 
enemy lines from above. As the war progressed, airplanes on both sides quickly outgrew their 
reconnaissance uses, and could signal directions or drop bombs.
79
 Fuller’s inclusion of airplanes 
as another branch of the army has more to do with their aerial capabilities than their firepower, 
but he was familiar with the methods used by airplanes to signal tank battalions on the ground. 
Though he did not defend them or fight for them as strongly as he did for the tanks, Fuller may be 
excused this bias due to his position on the Tank Corps staff. However, Fuller did not invite 
dramatic contrasts between airplanes and tanks, despite their similar novelty and their potentials 
to revolutionize warfare. For him, the tank was still the primary object of mechanical warfare. 
As Fuller returned to France, he continued his campaign of writing and messaging, 
attempting to make some headway in either increasing the production of tanks or of standardizing 
a new program of tank tactics to be taught to all tank battalions. At this time, he also composed 
the early sketches of “Plan 1919,” the next tactical step after the projected outcome of 1918. 
There was always a need for more tanks, seen first at the Somme, as Swinton argued and Stern 
claimed that there were barely enough tanks to be effective, then at Cambrai, as Fuller 
bemoaned the lack of reasonable reserves. The peak of this need was revealed in “Plan 1919,” 
the crowning achievement of the Tank Corps had the war not ended in November 1918. Fuller, 
among others, had begun expanding Martel’s earlier ideas of a tank army; with the introduction of 
Whippet tanks and the expansion of gun-carrier/supply tank divisions, tanks could reasonably 
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perform multiple duties, and act in supporting roles to carry an offensive almost entirely with 
tanks.
80
 Plan 1919 formed a grand tactical doctrine in which tanks would form a central part of 
offensive maneuvering, and the production of tanks was necessarily increased to meet the need 
for such a large number.  
Before this doctrine saw any traction, however, Fuller only met with disappointment. The 
tanks spread out across the Western Front so as to make the accumulation of reserves even 
more difficult, and the issue of supplying all the tanks formed a logistical nightmare for the Tank 
Corps staff. As tanks slowed to a halt due to lack of petrol, they were reorganized or reformed 
into Lewis-gun companies, prompting Fuller to revisit his tactical notes on Lewis-gun Battalion 
Organization. Fuller also made mention of his visits to the battlefield, bolstered by the visits of his 
GSOs (Martel, Hotblack, and Boyd-Rochfort).
81
 At a time when GHQ seemed uncertain of their 
approach, and in light of the repeated idea that GHQ was ignorant of the conditions of the front 
lines, Fuller’s presence at the front bolstered his own credibility as a tactician and officer. While 
he lacked Elles’s charisma, Fuller still appreciated the conditions of the front and the struggles 
facing the tank crews, even if he never saw action in the tank himself. Furthermore, Fuller worked 
hard to produce tactical manuals for consumption by tank crews, noting that his quick writings 
might not have been so savory to higher officers since they were not in “General Staff 
language.”
82
 Even for Fuller, who had the authority and experience to claim a higher rank than the 
average tank crew member, there remained a division in expectations and limitations between 
Tank Corps staff and the rest of the B.E.F.  
The early months of 1918 were characterized for Fuller by a system of raids. With the 
tanks spread so far across the line, the best that could be expected would be minor 
breakthroughs, predicated on close coordination between infantry and the tanks. However, 
though the tank crews had expressed their greatest fears about disbandment or the abolishment 
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of the Tank Corps at the Battle of Passchendaele a year earlier, Fuller’s worries about the Tank 
Corps’ future were only sharpened by these months of raids. Battalions were reduced and 
reorganized without consultation with Fuller or Elles, and it was only the arrival of Winston 
Churchill (then the Minister of Munitions) who came to Fuller as a heroic savior, promising the 
construction of a new tank factory in France for the common use of the Allied Powers. Although 
Fuller had been aware of the construction of French tanks, they had played little part in his 
tactical designs; now, with the French investing more intently in their own tanks, Fuller found a 
new position to play as part of the Inter-Allied Tank Committee, and gratefully congratulated the 
perspective of a French High Command that believed “tanks were infantry savers, and 
consequently, it was essential that large numbers should be built.”
83
 Instead of focusing on the 
battles taking place, like the battle of Amiens or Arras that were occupying the men of the tank 
crews, Fuller was investing himself more heavily into the position that would seem to use his 
talents most fully. The winter of 1917-18 had forced Haig and the British G.H.Q. to coordinate 
ever more closely with French commanders to draw up strategy, and this pooling of resources 
followed the creation of joint staff and initial attempts at cooperation.
84
 Though British 
administrators were hesitant to accept input from French commanders, the tank factory was 
constructed as needed, using French laborers and prepared to produce British designs. 
Apparently not biased by national pride or lingering xenophobia, Fuller embraced the involvement 
of the French and of the newly-arrived Americans, eager to see tanks used by all three armies.  
Fuller’s work was not yet done with GHQ, however: in May, Mark V tanks finally emerged 
from their production lines and were coming to France piece by piece, while communications and 
letters from England reinforced Fuller’s earlier ideas about tank organization and instructed Haig 
(and others) to avoid breaking up tank battalions or reorganizing them at will. The attention of the 
French to tank matters may have also influenced GHQ’s decision to supply more men for the 
Tank Corps, though the shipment of Mark V tanks also required the arrival of new crews. Fuller 
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found the Tank Corps triumphant, finally appreciated as a separate, unique arm of battle, and not 
merely subservient to the infantry and no mere replacement for cavalry. In his estimation, Haig 
simply could not conceive of this, and thus had resisted the tanks—however, with orders from 
above and the pressure of French interest, the Tanks flourished under Fuller’s tactics more 
profitably than they had throughout the war.  
Fuller quite consciously described the struggles with GHQ as a battle in their own right, a 
“paper war” that consumed his time and energy.
85
 He, alongside the other Tank Corps staff, had 
been engaged in a flurry of letter-writing, pamphlet-producing, and visit-making to sway GHQ, 
and as the spring of 1918 came to an end, Fuller looked back with regret at the time they had 
wasted. The Tank Corps had justified its existence through victories on the battlefield, and 
emerged from 1917 with valuable experience, but as the staff had been so occupied with 
negotiating with GHQ, they had neglected the training and preparation that would make their 
newer tank battalions fit for battle. As Fuller turned his attention back to training, he continued to 
find reasons to praise French intervention, praising their training methods and tank battalions: 
“They were wonderfully intelligent when compared to British soldiers, and their enthusiasm in 
their training was unbounded.”
86
 As the French army, and later the American army, was included 
in the training and use of tanks, Fuller began to consider it a priority that the Tank Corps be 
acknowledged as a vital part of the British army, since that legitimacy would allow them to 
coordinate more thoroughly with the tank sections of other armies. Fuller began to move between 
the concept of a strictly British Tank Corps, proposing methods of reorganization to facilitate 
communication, and the ideal of a united Allied Tank Committee, which was difficult to coordinate 
when each army was still unsure of the position of tanks within their organization.  
Events on the ground still had the power to command Fuller’s attention, and though he 
did reference the glory which various tank battalions earned through the spring and summer 
months of 1918, it was the Battle of Hamel on July 4
th
 that he credited as a turning point in the 
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understanding of tank tactics.
87
 For Fuller, it was mere common sense: the Battle of Hamel simply 
exemplified the potential of the tanks, using them in an aggressive raid to capture only a few 
miles at a time while counteracting the German advance. From the perspective of morale, the raid 
was a great boon to the general army, and the fact that no tank personnel were lost in the attack 
made a great impression on non-tank commanders. At last, the tanks had the numbers, the 
training, and the proper bureaucratic support to make a difference. Fuller was delighted, not 
merely by the success of the tanks but by the newfound respect and assistance he gained in 
working with other staff members. He emphasized the need to coordinate with the French and 
won for himself the ability to travel between England and France freely, reorganizing his routine 
duties for others to take on.  
Fuller referenced two further battles, one on August 8
th
 and the later Battle of Amiens, as 
further notes of success for the Tank Corps. Fuller’s greater concern, beyond the real 
accomplishments of these battles, was his planning for “Plan 1919.” Plan 1919 had existed as a 
concept in the mind of Fuller, Martel, and d’Eyncourt, who all planned for great numbers of tanks 
to form “tank armies”, not merely tank battalions. While the tank crews fought their battles of 
petrol and steel, Fuller concerned himself with defending a doctrine predicated on the production 
of thousands of tanks. He partially blamed the novelty of tanks for the resistance he met: since 
tanks were so new, his correspondents in England and in GHQ could not understand how to use 
them properly. Again, Fuller characterized Haig in particular as resistant to the increases in tanks; 
while Fuller recognized tanks as “the superior weapon,”
88
 their moderate usage made it difficult to 
prove their utility until they were present in larger numbers. By June of 1918, GHQ and the War 
Office finally agreed with Fuller that an increased production of tanks was necessary if the war 
was to end in 1919, and this news prompted Fuller to compose the first full doctrine of Plan 1919. 
Though it was similar in many points to his earlier writings, it is important to note that Fuller took 
into consideration the creation of supply tanks and the development of current tank models, 
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rather than speaking generally about armor and mobility. Fuller also brought up the possibility of 
using naval tactics in conjunction with traditional infantry and artillery tactics, hearkening back to 
the early years of the “Landships Committee” and the early naval influences of the tanks.  
Mobility, armor, and mechanization formed the cornerstones of Fuller’s doctrine. In Plan 
1919, Fuller explicitly identified mechanical power as an element of the tank that would force an 
army, and indeed even a nation, to reconsider its approach to war. Mobility and armor were 
themes that had been present in war throughout the centuries, though Fuller claimed never as 
fully realized as they would be in tanks, but mechanization was an element totally new to warfare. 
Saving manpower by replacing it with machine-power not only reduced the need for huge armies 
of infantry but had the potential to reduce casualties.
89
  
Fuller was justifiably proud of his production of Plan 1919, and his next task was to pass 
this document up the chain of command. The Battle of Hamel helped, in that it gave him 
additional material with which to convince commanders of the utility of tanks, but he found that it 
was the growing confidence engendered in infantry divisions that helped the tanks most. Though 
the Australians had derided the tanks early in their deployment, the raids of 1918 restored their 
confidence and convinced both average troops and their commanders that the tanks had real 
value. Fuller also credited the involvement of the French General Foch for the new support for 
tank offensives, since Foch was more enthusiastic about the tanks than General Haig, and plans 
were made for a decisive offensive to take place early in 1919, once thousands of tanks were 
available for all three armies (British, French, and American) to use in tandem.
90
 The battle of 
August 8
th
, and the last Hundred Days of the war, soon saw this plan made moot, but its adoption 
among GHQ was one of Fuller’s proudest achievements. 
Despite Fuller’s derision of General Haig, the Hundred Days saw Haig’s greatest 
strength—his stubbornness—finally put to good use in Fuller’s eyes. The pressure of the Allied 
offensive was assisted by tanks, though directed by Haig, and Fuller found a bitter irony in the 
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fact that Haig’s victory should be won by the very machines he had ignored for so long. Despite 
his position as a man of tactics and logic, Fuller still attached his personal dignity to the tanks 
themselves, and after having positioned Haig as his primary opponent, the fact that Haig should 
lead the Allies to victory annoyed Fuller.  
The raids of 1918 made little impression on Haig’s memory, but their lessons were not 
unnoticed. The development in models was evident even to Haig’s untrained eye, and the 
coordination of barrage, tank, then infantry demonstrated an exercise that to Haig was “more 
effective and much less costly to us.”
91
 The use of barrage is notable, simply because Fuller and 
other tank men had been trying to argue against the use of barrage at all. Artillery barrages, when 
laid down before an offensive maneuver, often allowed the German army to predict the likely 
position of the offensive, and also made the ground much rougher and less stable. In Fuller’s 
doctrine, which called for swift, unpredictable movements led primarily by tanks, artillery barrage 
did more harm than good. However, it is clear that even in 1918, this doctrine had not filtered 
through the British army enough to influence tank tactics in reality. While Fuller might have 
blamed this lack of change on the stiffness of GHQ thinking, or the obstinacy of Haig himself, 
there is a note of naivety in expecting the entire tactical doctrine of the British army—an army 
beset by uncertainties and exhausted after years of war—to change merely on the introduction of 
the tanks and Fuller’s impassioned pamphlets. Though Haig’s records were far less emotional 
and less invested in the tanks than were Fuller’s memoirs, Haig’s impressions reflected more of 
the reality: the tanks in 1918 were more effective than in 1917, even without Fuller’s radical 
changes, and Haig was fully prepared to use them as best he could.  
The action in August 1918 illustrated Haig’s approach to tank warfare most thoroughly, 
namely because there were enough tanks for them to coordinate with multiple infantry divisions at 
multiple locations. Haig’s generals, General Lambert and General Byng, had tanks available for 
the month of August, though Haig did not describe their tactical plans. However, the availability of 
tanks reinforced Fuller’s impression of August as an important month for the Tank Corps, and 
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even as the Hundred Days began, the tanks were in good standing for Haig, his subordinates, 
and the Tank Corps themselves. Their numbers might have been strong, but the Hundred Days 
Offensive proved taxing for their meager resources, and the workshops in France were unable to 
recover tanks fast enough to keep up with the pace of the front during the Hundred Days. Just as 
at the Somme, the lack of sufficient numbers of tanks prevented the tanks from dominating the 
battlefield. However, Fuller did not have Stern or Swinton’s apprehension to using tanks in small 
numbers. His experience with the tanks on the front had given him enough evidence that tank 
raids could have a significant effect on the enemy’s movement, and he was more concerned with 
having the tanks see action than on the specific numbers used in that action. The early months of 
1918 had given the Tank Corps staff examples of profitable tank raids, but the movement of the 
Hundred Days Offensive gave them little time to arrange raids to their liking. “They [the tanks] 
frequently suffered high losses as a result of not being used in greater numbers, being spread too 
thinly across a broad front, and without due regard to their vulnerabilities.”
92
 The proposal to wait 
for ideal deployment circumstances as outlined by Fuller was ignored in favor of using the tanks 
as they became available.  
This use of the tanks, which also prevented them from building up sizable reserves as 
Fuller had wanted, reinforced the perception of the tanks among non-Tank Corps officers that the 
tanks were adjuncts to the infantry. At times, tanks could work on their own in planned 
movements and see great successes, but the realistic needs and the movement of the B.E.F. in 
1918 left little room for the tanks to develop as an arm or a force of their own. Though it was easy 
to blame GHQ or the War Office, as Fuller did, for the lack of tanks available, men like Stern who 
supported the tanks remained in positions of influence in the War Office and continued to 
coordinate the needs of supply. The tanks earned the attention they needed, but there was simply 
not enough time and not enough material to give the tanks the opportunity they needed. 
Just as the tanks did not arise from one specific designer or inventor, the difficulties they 
faced were not the result of a single area of resistance or ignorance. The tanks repeatedly 
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demonstrated their inefficiency in specific conditions, yet their promise was so great that multiple 
men of various ranks attached their careers to the tanks to force them into production. Fuller put 
this sentiment into words when he detailed how mechanical power would outpace manpower in 
the coming years, and his arguments for the use of tanks focused on the mechanical aspects of 
tanks that enabled them to perform better than their infantry or cavalry equivalents. The 
mechanical argument clearly captured the imagination of the War Office, given the attention that 
repeatedly returned to the tanks from 1914 to 1916, and even while the initial tank models proved 
unexciting their production never ceased completely.  
 For tank manufacturers, tank tacticians, and high commanders alike, the tanks were a 
good investment because of their potential for substantial advances on the battlefield. Haig 
believed the tanks could be effective in battle, and supported their production early in 1916; Fuller 
and Stern continued to argue that the tanks could be effective under the right circumstances, and 
fought to give the tanks the proper opportunity to display their utility. However, the end of the war 
in 1918 and the fact that Plan 1919 never came to fruition prevented the tanks from reaching the 
high point of their potential success. From a tactical standpoint, the tanks were always a potential, 
with little to guarantee their utility, thus their supporters had to reach for other aspects of the tanks 
to justify their existence. The infantry remained the primary force of the B.E.F., as the tanks 
lacked the numbers and the real evidence to support a total movement towards mechanization. 
Tanks needed to see action in order to provoke the development of better, updated tank models, 
but the delays and shortages incurred in ordering new models stalled real development, and 
made the tanks outdated almost as soon as they saw action. Most tank administrators would only 
realize this in hindsight once they could compare the models against one another: Major 
Hotblack, looking back on the experience, believed that “the first tank which was really war-
worthy was the Mark V which was used in numbers on 8 August 1918.”
93
 However, without the 
long history or full support of the administration that infantry divisions enjoyed, the administrators 
of the Tank Corps still developed deep attachments to their roles and to the tanks themselves. 
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The fascination of the tanks kept men like Stern and Fuller involved with the development of the 
tanks, attaching their reputations to untried machines. A buoyant optimism, coupled with the 
ability to shift blame away from one’s department and onto the higher administration, kept the 
early Tank Corps officers from falling into despair, and by defining their work as a “paper war” 
against the prejudices of GHQ, tank officers justified their efforts on two fronts. Not only would 
they usher in a new age of warfare by promoting mechanization, but they would help to dismantle 
a stale and calcified Staff College mentality for the better of the British Army. The men who fought 
for the tanks in this sense created for themselves a tactical niche and a unique identity, justifying 
themselves in both the present and future by their efforts.  
 46 
 
CHAPTER 2 
Though the designers and engineers of England appreciated in the tanks for their 
theoretical utility, they were not the men who crewed the tanks in battle. Groups of men, trained in 
the use of the guns in the tanks and instructed in the mechanisms for driving the tanks, were 
initially under the command of infantry commanders, and lacked both the numbers and the 
organization to dictate their own movements. Though tied closely to the infantry and artillery, tank 
crews were not fully included in either group, and the shared experiences of tank crews slowly 
gave shape to a shared unit identity. Whether on the battlefield or off it, tanks united their crews in 
common education and experience, allowing tank crews to develop an identity around their 
shared experiences and their position within the British Expeditionary Force. 
The initial deployment of the tanks was a confusing affair, subject to the commands of the 
British commander Sir Douglas Haig and restricted by the lingering concerns of the tank 
developers in Britain. The men recruited for the tank crews were educated at tank training camps 
and put through a system of education that established them as tank crew members, but this 
degree of separation did not prevent them from experiencing the trauma of the front lines 
alongside their infantry counterparts. In addition to these stressors, tank crews also had concerns 
about the administrative position of the tanks, and tank commanders recognized their unique 
position as pioneers of the new weapon even as they faced the potential dissolution of the tank 
units after a lack of positive results. The creation of the Tank Corps gave the tank crews 
legitimacy as a unit, and the increasing number of tanks contributed to more tank victories 
through 1917 and 1918.By the end of the war, the Tank Corps had become a significant fighting 
force, with the administrative strength to work independently of other branches and the 
experience to enter a battle with confidence in their own abilities. 
 
Initial Battles 
The first battle of the tanks was the Battle of Flers-Courcelette on 15 September, 1916, 
and was part of the larger Battle of the Somme. The Somme offensive began in July of 1916, but 
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the development of the tanks had encouraged Haig to use them as soon as feasibly possible 
instead of waiting for the offensive to conclude. There existed some tension between the hopes of 
Haig and the realistic expectations of men like Stern: the official Tank Corps history records that 
there were not enough tanks produced and delays were consistently urged by the men 
overseeing their development. However, Haig “was convinced that the advantages outweighed 
‘the disadvantages of making known to the enemy the existence of these new engines of war’.”
94
 
Haig had by this time already been appointed as Commander of the British Expeditionary Force 
(B.E.F.) on the Western Front, but his ability to strongarm the tank designers into sending the 
tanks early reflected his own perception of the war and the promise of the tanks. It is somewhat 
unfair to position only Haig as the antagonist in this miniature drama, but the military author Sir 
Basil Liddell Hart and officers Stern, Swinton, and Fuller rarely offered another example of a high-
ranking officer who made excessive demands of the tanks without understanding their 
capabilities. Regardless of the political and tactical arguments in play, the tank crews were 
shipped to France with Mark I tanks and considered part of the Machine Gun Corps (Heavy 
Branch) for the purposes of coordination and deployment in their first military action. 
For the men trained to crew the tanks, the lack of practical experience with tanks given 
their quick deployment was easily overcome. Most men were drawn from the Machine Gun 
Corps, the branch to which the tanks were first assigned, and their training with the Vickers and 
Lewis machine guns were enough to qualify them to operate the guns on a tank. One hurdle was 
the mechanical bulk of the tanks: easily over 25 tons each, turning a Mark I tank required the 
coordination of three separate men, all inside the enclosed metal box of the cab. (This held true 
for the later Mark IV as well, but was resolved by the production of the Mark V.)
95
 The engine 
lacked adequate exhaust ports and filled the cab with noise, meaning that the driver of the tank 
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was forced to tap or kick the man beside him to indicate a change of gear.
96
 Before tanks were 
provided in large quantities, tank crews sometimes did not even have a tank with which to train, 
and were forced to practice maneuvers by carrying a wood and canvas model, much like a 
hunting blind, on their shoulders.
97
 While administrators and supply coordinators worked to 
improve the tank designs, early tank crews filled their time with training, doing their best to 
prepare for battle despite the novelty of their tanks. 
Though the tank crews worked hard to train with their tanks, with less than 50 tanks 
available by September 15, 1916 a high rate of mechanical failure reduced the number of tanks 
significantly. Transporting the tanks and crews from their training camps to the front lines 
occurred without incident, but seventeen tanks failed to reach their starting points on the morning 
of the battle.
98
  Further losses from shelling and ditching (when tanks would fall into shell holes or 
trenches and become stuck) also prevented tanks from reaching the action, and the actual impact 
of the tanks was minimal at best. Mechanics did their best to try and rehabilitate tanks in time for 
action, but a lack of practical experience with complicated repair work and a lack of appropriate 
supplies made it difficult to effect repairs quickly. Haig’s hoped-for demoralization of German 
troops was limited to those troops who actually saw tanks—not the entire front, but only sporadic 
trenches—and where the tanks were able to make breakthroughs, they rarely saw action alone. It 
was the close coordination of infantry and the tanks that reliably guaranteed movement forward, 
and this pattern would hold true for much of the war.  
For those tanks that truly saw action, the first battle was a proud moment. A particularly 
newsworthy instance, where a tank paraded down the street of a recaptured French town, held 
weight for both tank men and their infantry counterparts. The image of proud British soldiers, 
surrounding a tank with smiles, was a public relations victory for the tanks to accompany their 
modest successes. After the initial battle, life returned to a semblance of normal for the newly 
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christened tank crews, where decisions made by higher commanders organized and reorganized 
the tanks over time. However, the growth of the tank groups meant that battle experience became 
a rare commodity, and new recruits “looked with awe” at the men, now officers or lieutenants, 
granted command of a tank after participating at Flers-Courcelette.
99
 The issue of secrecy was a 
concern no longer, as William Watson noted upon his transfer in January of 1917, since officials 
shouted for tank recruits to board the trains, the purpose of the trains to the tank depot was 
publicly known, and even in the hotel discussion of tanks was audibly rampant.
100
  
Men who were not in the Tank Corps began to contextualize the tanks within the network 
of the army. A gunner with the Machine Gun Corps, Alexander Wright, considered accepting 
recruitment into the tank crews, but turned down the offer: “They [casualties] must have been 
colossal in the Tank Corps. … They went back to billets, which were heaven to us, and…got the 
benefit of extra rations now and again, but I was not sorry that I didn’t have to go over to the Tank 
Corps.”
101
 Wright afforded the tank crews a level of elitism above even that of the general 
Machine Gun Corps, but this came more from their allocation of resources; like the men of the 
Royal Flying Corps, the tank crews were given specific quarters separated from the front lines, 
clustered in ‘tankodromes’ that mirrored the RFC’s aerodromes.
102
 Since the tanks still required 
some degree of secrecy, tanks and the men that crewed them remained further behind the front 
lines, and thus had a more relaxed living situation as opposed to the infantrymen at the very front. 
The tank crews did not live in trenches, and this fact alone gave them a level of “luxury.”
103
 
Despite these benefits, Wright’s concern over the amount of casualties influenced his relief at 
                                                          
99
 Williams-Ellis, The Tank Corps, 39. 
 
100
 Watson, A Company of Tanks, Chapter II. 
 
101
 Alexander Wright, sound recording, 1977; catalogue no. 33696, Reel 2 (3:30); Imperial War Museum, 
London, England. 
 
102
 Steel and Hart, Tumult in the Clouds, 24. 
 
103
 Bertram Steward, sound recording, 1986; catalogue no. 9279, Reel 4; Imperial War Museum, London, 
England. 
 
 50 
 
avoiding the tank crews, illustrating that even the lure of material comforts was not always 
enough to convince potential recruits of the value of the tank crews.  
Absorbing men with varied backgrounds required the tank commanders to administer 
basic training, and thus the Mark II tanks appeared in training exercises at a camp established in 
Bovington, England, to familiarize men with the guns and gears of the tanks. These were similar 
enough to Mark I tanks so as to encourage effective training, and Mark IIs were sent to France 
periodically during the early months of 1917 when the promised new model, the Mark IV, was not 
produced in time for effective action.
104
 Balancing the demands of the training camp with the 
output of British factories and the needs of the active units at the front placed an even greater 
pressure on the administrators and organizers of the tank project within the War Office, men like 
Stern and Ellis who had already worked long and hard to produce the existing tank models, and 
tank crews occasionally ended up in administrative limbo as new recruits were left without tanks 
to use for training or even to take into battle. Though the tanks and their crews had seen action in 
September 1916, they were little more than machines and men thrown together in a jumble of 
command and training, lacking the organization and unit cohesion that lent established divisions 
much needed morale. However, training would form an important step in satisfying this need, and 
the collection of recruits into their training camps helped provide a common ground for 
newcomers to enter the world of the tanks. 
 
Joining the Tanks 
 Early recruits for the tank crews came from the divisions of the Motor Section of the 
Machine Gun Corps, relying on their experience with combustion engines to inform their work 
with the tanks. However, recruitment efforts did not stop with the Machine Gun Corps, and men 
from civilian and military circles alike found their way to the tank crews. Though unified by their 
interest in the tanks, most new recruits had little else in common, and the new tank commander 
William Watson noted that “[t]hey trail along like a football crowd. They have no pride in their 
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appearance, because they cannot feel they are on parade. They are only a crowd, not a company 
or regiment. Corporate pride and feeling are absent.”
105
 Recruitment had brought these men 
together, but had not given them a collective identity; until late in 1917, the tank crews did not 
even have an emblem or banner under which to unify. Though the senior officers and 
commanders would do their best to instill a feeling of camaraderie, the men themselves found 
their own ways to establish commonality. For one Sergeant Littledale, it was not the spirit of 
brotherhood or similarity that drew men into the tank crews, but a “spirit of adventure,” which 
served to sustain them through the weeks of training and the chores of mechanical 
maintenance.
106
 The corporate singing of a wartime song, “Fred Karno’s Army,” which referenced 
the chaos of a popular comedian’s troupe, gave them a collective purpose and provided the first 
step towards fellowship.  
Another newly appointed commander, Captain Daniel Hickey, though born in Argentina, 
believed himself a Briton through and through, and when the war began in 1914 he was eager to 
sign up for the B.E.F. His impetus for joining the tanks, when they became available in 1916, was 
a fascination with machinery, and a tank poster outside a recruitment office sparked his 
imagination further.
107
 It was the visual depiction of the tank, emphasizing its mechanical nature, 
which attracted this young soldier to its service. His mechanical interest was hardly unusual, as 
Hickey went on to relate the personalities of his young subordinates, one of whom “knew the 
engine of a motor-cycle inside out.”
108
  The Heavy Branch of the Machine Gun Corps became a 
collecting ground for military personnel with a knowledge of or interest in machinery. Hickey’s 
entire journey from schoolboy to soldier was one defined by machines:  his initial aim in signing 
up was to be a driver of a military car; he avoided being sent to Gallipoli by suffering a concussion 
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in a car accident in 1915; the time he spent on coursework in Britain gave him the technical 
knowledge of Lewis guns which made him ideal for appointment to the Machine Gun Corps; and 
his study of engines allowed him to maneuver into a superior position upon being appointed to 
the Heavy Branch.  
The division between other infantrymen and the crews of the tanks never came under 
scrutiny in Hickey’s evaluation, but the lack of references to non-tank personnel indicated to what 
extent the tank crews and their captains were segregated from non-tank infantrymen. The loss of 
a group of 13 tank crew members during an easy road repair mission provoked the displeasure of 
commanding officers, who questioned the wisdom of having tank crews “doing the work of a 
labour gang.”
109
 There was evidently a value to tank crews beyond their mere physical ability: a 
technical aspect of tank crews and their training made them more valuable than the average 
working soldier. Hickey’s own experiences with non-tank infantry divisions spoke to the perceived 
values within each group. “I had not been happy with the Suffolks [another regiment]; principally I 
imagine because I did not belong to the county; with the tanks I was absolutely at home, because 
it seemed to me that I was pulling my weight, and that my work was being appreciated.”
110
 With 
the mechanical emphasis of the tank crews, tank recruits could find value and community in this 
shared interest instead of relying on pre-war residences to define their unit. 
For Harold Littledale, having been recruited after the battle of Flers-Courcelette, the 
majesty and glory of the tanks had been his first impression: upon reaching the tank crews in 
person, he realized his hopes had been artificially inflated.  
So much had been printed, after their first appearance in battle, of their freakish 
appearance and their great size, that we expected something far more strange in 
design, more monstrous, more dragon-like, and twice as big. … We were 
disappointed, too, to find that the tank could not do all that we had heard it could 
do. We had quite expected to climb to the house-tops, or, failing that, to go right 
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through houses, to uproot great trees, and to waddle through wide rivers. The 
newspapers had depicted the tanks doing all these things.
111
  
The movement from infantryman (or cavalryman, or sailor, or pilot, or artillery gunner) to 
a member of the tank crews was also not a movement devoid of personal loss. Whatever the 
“spirit of adventure” might have compelled in a recruit, the moment when he learned of his 
transfer could provoke a sense of melancholy as he abandoned the men of his former group, with 
whom he had shared the hardships of war up to that point, for a new unknown horizon. Without 
time to say farewells, the new tank crewman would be sent through France to reach the depot 
where tank recruits received their new classifications.
112
 
Though men with experience in mechanical matters and others trained in artillery arrived 
as recruits at the depot, Littledale’s experience recorded that the exact method for assessing a 
man’s proficiencies was a mystery. According to Littledale, some mechanics went to the gunners’ 
company, while gunners ended up among drivers, but in the end, Littledale observed, “it did not 
matter much, for each driver had to qualify as a gunner, and each gunner was given an 
elementary tank course.”
113
 Ernie Hayward, an artillery man at the time of his transfer to the tank 
crews, made the same observation, claiming that though he had not entered the crew as a driver, 
he certainly left as a driver.
114
 Arthur Jenkin (recruited after entering the Royal Engineers) also 
made note of this curious method of assignment, since “only those with ‘mechanical’ inclinations 
are suited” to be drivers: the subsequent assignment and training of men without this inclination 
as drivers was, for Jenkin, a sorry waste of uninspired men.
115
 Beyond mere interest or 
mechanical proficiency, training began to establish further common ground among tank recruits, 
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letting them confront the administrative confusion with the realization that all the recruits were 
facing the same training and expectations.  
Though Littledale was no longer among infantryman, he claimed that his training seemed 
dangerous to the average soldier. For infantrymen, the more training they were given, the more 
often they would be needed, and thus the more often they would see battle. Knowledge, for these 
men, was only a way to increase the risk of war.
116
 Jenkin also put the tank crews in contrast with 
other army recruits based on their knowledge and the importance it held for them, since he had 
first seen action as an infantryman in France beginning in 1916. In his estimation, “’to think’ is a 
quality commendable to all young men, but in military life it is very apt to bring much trouble in its 
train. … To be like a mechanical doll begets more approval than to possess the brain wealth of 
Plato.”
117
 
After joining the tank crews, Jenkin’s perspective changed:  
There is scarcely any branch of the Army that demands more brain work from the 
private than does a complete set of courses in the Tank Corps. He is at once a 
mechanist, artilleryman, and machine gunner, and must also know the use of rifle 
and bayonet, revolver and bomb. He also has to become acquainted with 
semaphore signaling, compass and map reading, and drivers especially must 
possess a knowledge of how trenches, dug-outs, and machine-gun posts are 
constructed, indispensable on the battle-field to detect and avoid those parts that 
would probably get the tank stuck.
118
 
Even in the question of appearance, Jenkin found that the pressure of inspection doubled 
during the courses at the tank school. His earlier experiences with infantry had shown 
him the disappointing lack of flair in the British Army’s plain khaki uniforms, but the tank 
men at least had badges to polish and caps to keep in order. Though Jenkin, as a new 
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recruit and in no position of authority, had no say in the organization or creation of tank 
units, his catalogue of the tank school courses emphasized the shared experiences of 
these newest recruits, changing them from a general collection of recruits into men of the 
Tank Corps. 
Beyond the tank crews themselves, training on the Lewis gun allowed men like Hickey to 
empathize with men trained in the B.E.F. artillery, since their training was equally specialized and 
rigorous. Hickey’s connection to the Lewis gun, and his training therein, also illustrated a 
connection to the B.E.F. as a whole while still providing some definition to the tank crews: the 
need for specialized training on Lewis guns was common to the tank crews and to the artillery. 
Littledale was explicitly told in his training that “you will remember you are artillerymen,” and that 
those who failed the training courses would return to the infantry.
119
 Given that the Tank Corps 
had originated as a branch of the Machine Gun Corps, this natural common ground was the most 
explicit link between tank crews and non-tank crews. Most tank recruits had some experience of 
the British army before entering the crews, allowing them to recall their time in other positions, but 
this specific link with the artillery would become important again on the battlefield as the tanks 
coordinated with artillerymen to make their pushes. 
The process of training did much to establish regularity and cohesion among the tank 
battalions, even though they might not see much action initially. As a young man fresh from the 
rigor of public school, Wilfred Bion felt comforted by the structure of the camp, finding that “it was 
a good camp, well disciplined—not ramshackle, temporary and amateur like so much I had seen 
in my feverish and irritable progress. This I felt was it.”
120
 The ritual and procedure of training lent 
regularity to the lives of the tank recruits, and for Bion in particular, it was more familiar to have 
one’s life dictated and regulated by a higher power in contrast to the chaos crews would 
experience at the front. William Watson, who had been among military men since the beginning 
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of the war, recognized the power of routine in unifying men in his recollection: “There is nothing in 
the world like smart drill under a competent instructor to make a company out of a mob. Train a 
man to respond instantly to a brisk command and he will become a clean, alert, self-respecting 
soldier.”
121
  
However, though the power of work and regulation were very real for the new tank 
battalions, equally powerful was the influence of play. It was not long after the creation of the 
battalions that Watson’s company formed a football team, existing as informal ambassadors to 
other companies whenever they organized a match. Officers too would join in, shouting 
encouragement (or florid curses) from the sidelines. Watson carried the idea of “play” even 
further, claiming that on rare occasions, they were “allowed to play” with real tanks instead of 
canvas blinds for training.
122
 These training events would include spectators, lending the entire 
event a more theatrical tone than a serious training exercise might warrant. These exercises were 
not simply entertainment, for the various participants did learn how to coordinate, move with, and 
trust their tank crews, and the months of training allowed Watson to declare that the company 
had found itself as early as March of 1917.
123
 This was fortunate, as the companies were soon 
called into action at the Ancre in the Battle of Arras. 
 
Trials at the Front 
Watson referred to the tanks more frequently as he prepared to face his first tank action 
at the Hindenburg Line, and this repeated reference gave him cause to assign the tanks specific 
pronouns. It apparently seemed natural to Watson, despite any history or reference to the navy or 
artillery, to call the tanks “she”, and refer to them with female pronouns. He also took the time to 
describe the tanks in more detail, perhaps feeling that since they had reached their natural 
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environment at the front lines, he could describe them as they ought to have been described. Like 
most of his contemporaries, Watson reached for bestial metaphors: the tanks were “patient 
animals” and “performing elephants”, though Watson also made curious use of a reference to 
“gray sliding masses.”
124
 The tanks were both familiar and alien, especially when Watson was 
attempting to coordinating their movements in the hours before dawn. The sound of the tanks, 
coupled with the tension before a battle and Watson’s knowledge of the mass of the tanks, made 
an already eerie atmosphere doubly tense. Men could familiarize themselves with the tanks as 
much as they liked, but one wrong move in a tank could still crush a man before the drivers had 
any inkling of danger, making tanks a source of concern even among their own crews. 
The importance of reconnaissance and communication developed importance most 
clearly in Watson’s experience at Bullecourt. Required to stay back with generals and staff 
officers, Watson had sent out his tank company to join the Fifth Army at the front lines, but a 
blizzard made guiding the tanks and following the track to their starting positions nearly 
impossible. Tanks were accustomed to following tracks of tape laid out in front of them, since 
shouting directions would prove useless to men crammed into the tank’s cab, but snowfall made 
the laying of tape in Watson’s anecdote ultimately useless.  
Outside of the tank crews, communication was also necessary to inform infantry 
commanders of the tanks, and to prepare the infantry divisions for moving with the tanks. In 
preparing for the battle, Watson noted that “my tanks were detailed to cooperate very closely with 
the infantry,” as if this command was not the same directive being given to tank commanders 
across the Western Front.
125
 Coordination between tanks and the infantry would determine the 
efficiency of any tank attack, and as infantrymen became more accustomed to working with 
tanks, the presence of tanks on the Western Front would become correspondingly more effective. 
Men from Stern to Fuller had acknowledged at least some need for tanks to coordinate closely 
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with infantry divisions, but Watson’s identification of this specific detail indicated that it was either 
new to his thinking, or that he found it pertinent enough to mention to his audience. The tanks 
were not merely a branch of artillery, though they still were formally a subsection of the Machine 
Gun Corps: rather, the tactical demands of a tank commander and a tank company required a 
thorough understanding of infantry movements, rather than a vague large-scale coordination of 
artillery and infantry. This tactical perspective was not as important in Watson’s account as it is in 
others, namely the perspective of tactician Major J.F.C. Fuller, but these tactical themes of 
coordination and the purpose of the tank reflected the novelty of the tanks and the demands 
made on tacticians by the presence of these new machines.  
Watson’s appreciation of infantry was evident in his concern over the planned action at 
Bullecourt. In his words, “I was desperately anxious that the tanks should prove an overwhelming 
success,” was certainly in character for a tank commander worried about position, prestige, or his 
company, but the next sentence, “It was impossible not to image what might happen to the 
infantry if the tanks were knocked out early in the battle,” illustrated Watson’s empathy for 
infantrymen (a rank he had left only a few months prior) and the lack of division between tank 
crews and the infantry.
126
 Despite the introduction of the tanks, the additional training required of 
tank crews, and the changing tactics that accommodated the tanks, some tank commanders saw 
no difference between their efforts as tank men and their efforts as part of the British army. Close 
coordination with the infantry necessarily meant that the tanks and infantry relied on each other 
for any measure of success or even survival. Watson, at least, was conscious of these ties and 
chose to view himself and his company as soldiers first, tank men second.  
Unfortunately, reports during the battle itself indicated a grim outlook for the tanks. While 
tank mechanics and organization had improved somewhat from their first excursion at Flers-
Courcelette, the difficulty of Watson’s company in reaching Bullecourt may have affected their 
performance in the battle itself, and the hurried report that all the tanks had been “knocked out” 
brought both Watson and his Australian infantry counterparts a measure of dismal horror. The 
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aftermath of the battle was slightly more reassuring, as a sizable portion of Watson’s tanks were 
in fact recoverable, but even when relating the damages and losses, Watson did not fall into 
despair. He did devote sizable quantities of text to the various actions of his men, much like other 
formal histories would do in the interwar years. Watson did his best to preserve a tone of heroism, 
even when a trio of tank men journeyed back into No Man’s Land to retrieve a Primus stove—“It 
was a valuable stove, and he did not wish to lose it.”
127
—and return with a previously evacuated 
tank. Though humorous, Watson did not use the anecdote to poke fun at his men, but to present 
their heroism in a new light: even when the tanks were knocked out and the battle over, the tank 
crews still possessed their innate courage and motivation, turning a minor adventure into a 
triumphant excursion.  
Though Watson was able to record heroism and diligence on the small scale, his 
presentation of larger events was more pessimistic. The First Battle of Bullecourt was a failure, 
even a “minor disaster,” and Watson chose to characterize the tanks as “nothing but a broken 
reed.”
128
 The deeper tragedy for Watson was  that his Australian companions, those who had 
fought alongside the tanks and to which he afforded so much concern, immediately distrusted the 
tanks and began to doubt their utility. This doubt shook Watson, so much so that when writing his 
memoir in 1920 he devoted several pages to justifying the use of tanks and defending his 
company specifically. He even quoted praise from General Hugh Elles himself, “This is the best 
thing that tanks have done yet,”
129
 and referenced formal messages of congratulation to bolster 
his position. Watson felt wounded by the apparent betrayal from the Australians, a betrayal made 
keener by his earlier empathy toward them, and he had to negotiate his identity and position as a 
tank commander by identifying both small scale successes and wider acknowledgement. 
In the Second Battle of Bullecourt, Watson again found great importance in supporting 
the infantry. Additionally, as a commander, he began to recognize his own helplessness in the 
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midst of a battle: “We, who had set the stage, had only to watch the play. We could not 
interfere.”
130
 Identifying himself with the families of his men, Watson accepted reports with the 
emotional impact they required, refusing to adopt a terse stoicism but expressing the turmoil that 
family members might have were they able to see the reports. In a further surprising moment of 
empathy, Watson described the actions of certain German soldiers as “brave,” and did not use 
euphemisms or glorious terms to describe how tank crews killed German soldiers in their 
trenches.
131
 In his description, both the tank crews and their German opponents were equally 
heroic, injecting a new dimension to a war memoir that tried to present both sides with some 
equanimity.  
 These months of conflict formed a secondary part of tank training, albeit training with a 
higher rate of casualties. The pressures of battle allowed men in the tank crews to familiarize 
themselves with their duties, while their captains and commanders adjusted to the demands 
made of them by infantry commanders. As more tank battalions were added, there came more 
opportunities for tank brigades and battalions to cooperate in small-scale actions, but the tanks 
were mostly directed by the needs of the infantry. Rarely did the tank headquarters have any say 
or relevance in the movements of individual brigades, and tanks were more often under the 
direction of an infantry commander. With this division between tank tactics and tank crews, tank 
crews focused on their experiences at the front to find a community. Even tank men who cared 
little about the details of tank tactics would understand the stresses of crewing a tank, and might 
well defend their tank comrades against slander by infantrymen. This resilience of brotherhood 
and strength of unity would be important for the tank crews in the coming months, as decisions 
from High Command would plunge the tanks into the mud of Passchendaele. 
Though the Battle of Passchendaele, or the Third Battle of Ypres, is a disappointing 
chapter in the life of the young Tank Corps, its inclusion is vital. Few publications about 
Passchendaele, whether contemporary or historical, have treated Passchendaele as anything 
other than a failure. The Tank Corps followed this trend in both official histories and in less formal 
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publications. Those who condemned Commander Haig referenced this battle as an important 
aspect of his failings as commander, however, for the Tank Corps their condemnation and 
irritation at the battle took a sharper edge. Much of the Tank Corps saw the future of the corps 
itself at stake, and the concern over the future of the tanks overshadowed any concern about 
winning the battle.  
The unsuitability of the tank for the Passchendaele offensives also gave the tank men 
reason to worry. As the tanks were often mired in mud, they became difficult to move and difficult 
to direct, and their crews grew increasingly wary of being asked to travel any distance. The 
infrastructure of the B.E.F. at Passchendaele was in no way prepared for the presence of the 
tanks, and the material needs of the tanks often formed the first barrier to effective use.  
With some tanks weighing in at 28 tons, the B.E.F. lacked an equivalent machine to 
effectively unditch tanks which fell into the mud. Ditching had been a concern since the first 
appearance of the tanks, but the struggle to unditch tanks formed only part of the challenge 
facing the tank crews. Tank crews referenced the trucks and lorries which had been used on the 
improvised Passchendaele B.E.F. “roads” to that point, but emphasized how the 2 or 3 ton trucks 
were a fraction of the weight of the tanks. The packed mud and clay which formed the roads 
behind the Passchendaele lines often proved insufficient to carry tanks reliably.
132
 When tanks 
became ditched, they proved an inconvenience to the tank crews, the work crews called upon to 
try to unditch them, and the commanders who had ordered the tanks to change locations 
originally. As the Tank Corps lacked the organization, numbers, or commanders enough to 
dictate their own movements, they were still subject to the tactical decisions of infantry 
commanders. Concerned as these commanders were with men and horses, they often failed to 
recognize the limitations of the tanks in the Passchendaele mud.  
Though tanks and infantry performed to the best of their ability, exhaustion quickly set in, 
and the inability to effectively capture their objectives left divisions demoralized and irritated with 
the entire offensive. With tensions increasing due to the horrendous losses and the dismal 
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environment of Passchendaele, infantry commanders and troops grew more and more frustrated 
with the tanks, finding them only an extra annoyance instead of a suitable weapon, and the tank 
crews had good reason to fear that this frustration might translate into dissolution of the Tank 
Corps altogether.
133
 The issues of supply and the concerns of higher commanders worried them 
in an abstract, worst-case scenario way, and managing the immediate stress of battle and 
survival alongside the long-term stress of the potential dissolution of the Corp made this one of 
the most trying times in the Tank Corps’ history. However, as little as the tank crews might have 
thought of their infantrymen counterparts, General Douglas Haig, or the ministers of the Home 
Office, the Tank Corps was not disbanded, and they continued to be supplied as the B.E.F. 
withdrew the offensive from Passchendaele and turned its attentions to Cambrai.  
Passchendaele stood out as the time and place when the tank crews experienced the 
height of their nervous tension. The location timing of Passchendaele seemed to come from the 
pen of a particularly Dickensian author: the dreary rain, the soul-sucking mud, and omnipresent 
worry of dissolution united to plunge the tank crews into inescapable despair. The cruel 
coincidence of Passchendaele’s environment and its timing in the overall pattern of hostilities is 
not entirely by mere chance. The difficulties faced by the tanks in Passchendaele’s mud and rain 
illustrated their greatest shortcomings, and provided ample reason for commanders to dismiss, 
ignore, or berate the tanks. Had the tanks not been sent to Passchendaele, perhaps the morale 
and outlook of their crews would have been more improved. However, in a narrative sense, 
Passchendaele provided a time of increased tension that crew men would remember with horror, 
before finally emerging victorious at the Battle of Cambrai. Cambrai is the peak of the tanks’ 
performance in the First World War. 
Several benefits did come from the summer of 1917: the arrival of Mark IV tanks, with 
their improved design, made it slightly easier for tanks to maneuver and navigate; the official 
Royal Warrant which created the “Tank Corps” as their own arm lent further stability to the lives of 
the tank crews and assuaged their fears of dissolution; and finally, the minting of an official Tank 
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Corps badge allowed tank crews to finally develop an official uniform, reflecting their common 
purpose rather than their patchwork backgrounds. Few accounts of the battlefield took note of the 
developments, however, likely because the pressure of the offensive was their immediate 
concern.  
In his memoir, Commander Wilfred Bion’s experience combined with his internal conflicts 
about his familial relationships, the experience of joining the army, and the mechanical realities of 
the tank he commanded. Unfortunately, Bion led his first command as part of the Battle of 
Passchendaele, meaning that the first action Bion saw was covered in mud and limited by the 
narrow walkways constructed over the rivers and puddles. While shelling was a constant concern, 
the tank’s first real movement prompted a slurry of mud as the gun “ploughed through, not over, 
the ground.”
134
 Bion began to explore his exasperation with a “public school elite,” though he 
avoided pointing too directly to anyone within the administration of the army. In fact, Bion included 
himself in the “elite” that apparently forgot the natural result of water mixing with earth: in Bion’s 
account, the existence of mud proved a surprise to many men, and so he pokes fun at their 
collective ignorance on such basic matters. This identification with a “public school elite” persisted 
as Bion’s tank foundered, and was finally stuck in the mud, leaving Bion and his crew to huddle 
beside it and trade stories. An older man on the crew, nearly twice Bion’s age, described his 
family, and Bion realized that it was only a “public school culture” that had allowed him to rise to a 
position of authority based on his education and status instead of his experience.
135
  
Bion’s continual experience was one of disillusion, first with the public schools and elitism 
that administrated his life and then with the religion that had accompanied that schooling. The 
tanks are a minor, almost inconsequential factor in his de-conversion: the tank is literally a vehicle 
to carry him to these revelations, rather than an agent of revelation. Bion also included a mention 
of Haig, and even discussed the controversy over Haig’s decision to deploy tanks on ground 
clearly unsuitable for them at Passchendaele. 
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Haig and his Staff have been blamed for thinking that such terrain was suitable 
for tanks, for not reconnoitering the ground personally, for not understanding the 
capacities and limitations of tanks. Well, we three did know the tanks and we 
were reconnoitering the ground on the spot. But I do not remember that any of us 
for a moment thought that a forty-ton tank could float; the mud must have seeped 
into the place where our minds were supposed to be. The army, of which we 
were part, was mindless.
136
 
Bion recognized, with an important perspective for a tank crew member, that the tanks were part 
of the army at large, and that tank crews were not exempt from the stresses of army life. Bion 
also avoided placing blame with Douglas Haig for the decisions made about tank deployment, 
though whether this move reflected Bion’s prejudices or his lack of expectations is unclear. In the 
end, however, Bion gave an account which strove to emphasize the similarity, not the difference, 
between tanks and other non-tank soldiers, down to the confusion and lack of clear thinking that 
swamped men on “the front” at Passchendaele. Passchendaele challenged the tank crews in 
difficult ways, joining them with non-tank men in the struggle for survival. 
When the tanks went into action, however, Bion began to find the differences: since the 
tanks organized their line and began moving in the dark, it could be treacherous to try and 
coordinate with infantry and supply horses moving alongside. Furthermore, Bion’s position as 
commander meant that he had to walk in front and guide the tank along its path, meaning that if 
he fell unseen, it was likely he would be crushed beneath the tank’s treads. Caught in a rush of 
movement, Bion commanded his tank to stop, only for a fellow officer to question why the tanks 
had not yet reached their positions. In “some peace-time form of manners,” Bion apologized for 
the delay, and suffered the “curses and hate” of the infantry men around him as the tank moved 
along the narrow British lines again.
137
 This drama behind the lines affected tank crews in a 
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specific way, since the risk of working with the tanks was not as common to the infantry or cavalry 
units. Though Bion had only recently been assigned to the tanks, and considered himself an 
“amateur,” his identity was tied to the tank from the time of his training, and his concerns over the 
dissolution of the tank crews revealed his connection to the unit and his fellow tank men.  
Even in the holiday season of 1917, Bion and his men felt their worries compounded, the 
usual stresses of war worsening with the news of Russia’s withdrawal and the anxiety over the 
future of the tanks. However, despite the pressures of Passchendaele, the tank crews persisted 
through 1917, gathering strength and gaining the experience that would see them victorious at 
the Battle of Cambrai. 
 
Cambrai and Victory 
For men reliving their experiences after the Armistice, the memory of Cambrai stood in 
contrast with the memory of Passchendaele. The six months between the battles had not 
lessened the memory of Passchendaele for the men who had lived through it, and Bion’s 
experience illustrated how concerns about disbandment and the overall performance of the tanks 
remained a fixture in the minds of tank crews. However, in a dramatic counterpoint to the worries 
of the Battle of Passchendaele, the tank crews had been officially made members of the Tank 
Corps in July of 1917, meaning that the corps had finally grown large enough to escape the 
administrative umbrella of the Machine Gun Corps and were no longer a branch. With this new 
administrative freedom, the Battle of Cambrai came as a confirmation of the efforts of the tank 
crews and their commanders, granting them a dramatic victory with clear tank involvement. 
The Battle of Cambrai was notable for the Tank Corps not only because of their 
newfound appointment, but because they finally had a significant amount of tanks that would 
effectively see action. A total of 378 tanks were available for the November offensive, and 
mechanical issues were more easily addressed given the experience of the crews. The new Mark 
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IVs had effectively replaced the Mark I tanks, refining the design to improve handling.
138
 Instead 
of multiple drivers, tanks could be driven by a single driver, freeing other crew members for rest 
or for manning the guns. Finally, on the night before the battle, General Elles issued an order to 
the Tank Corps informing them that he would be personally leading the tanks in the centre 
division, prompting an outpouring of emotion from the crews and officers.
139
 Most tank crews, if 
they had the opportunity to meet Elles, remembered him fondly, and his declaration of joining 
them at the Battle of Cambrai only solidified his character in their eyes.
140
  
The main objective of the Battle of Cambrai was to overcome two ridges where German 
lines were established. Given a time limit of forty-eight hours, the tanks and infantry made their 
largest push on November 20, 1917, with November 21 spent mostly in establishing positions 
atop the old German lines. The official history of the Tank Corps records that it was “a deeper 
penetration made in a shorter time than in any previous offensive since the Western Front was 
cemented.”
141
 The rapid movement and clear successes provided a dramatic counterpoint to the 
extended, ineffective pushes at Passchendaele, and both the tank crews and their commanders 
found a new pride in claiming the Battle of Cambrai as their “coronation.”
142
 
After the disappointment of Passchendaele, Bion was able to find aspects to praise about 
the action of the tanks, and found the speed and movement at Cambrai a refreshing change. In 
drawing up to the line, “we broke through and over wire which at Ypres would have held fast for 
weeks any attack no matter how powerful the artillery support, and probably for as long as we 
cared to go on hanging our corpses on it.”
143
 The main advantages of the tanks were on full 
display, no longer merely tactical theory in Fuller’s papers, but military reality on the field.  
                                                          
138
 Royal Armoured Corps Tank Museum, Tanks: the First World War, 1915-1918, 13. 
 
139
 Fuller, Memoirs of an Unconventional Soldier, 202. 
 
140
 Horace Birks, sound recording,1976, catalogue no. 870, Reel 8; Imperial War Museum, London, England.  
 
141
 Hart, The Tanks, 147. 
 
142
 Hart, The Tanks, 128. 
 
143
 Bion, A Long Week-end, 161. 
 67 
 
Horace Birks, another tank crewman, felt that the cooperation between infantry and tank 
crews was lacking at the Battle of Cambrai, but he neglected to contrast this feeling with the 
experience of other battles.
144
 In fact, part of the reason for the lack of coordination was the fact 
that the tanks advanced faster than expected, and that fascines allowed the tanks to cross 
trenches more quickly, meaning that the tanks were advancing on enemy positions before the 
infantry had the chance to accompany them. Special tank fascines were developed at the Tank 
Corps Workshops in preparation for the attack on Cambrai, bundling brushwood into cylinders 4 
½ feet across, and these fascines facilitated a much faster penetration of enemy trenches and 
reduced the risk of tanks ditching themselves.
145
 Not only did the tank crews themselves display 
their improved ability on the field of Cambrai, but their victory was also a testament to the 
improved workshop capabilities and the army’s increasing ability to work with the strengths, not 
the weaknesses, of the tanks.  
Though the infantry may have been lacking, the battle of Cambrai became a vital memory 
for men of the tank crews, as Birks described: “Throughout the Corps, we thought we had 
established ourselves, which was something. [Later, when speaking with a nurse:] She told us 
that the bells of London had been rung for our victory…it was terrific.”
146
 There was immediate 
confirmation of the tanks’ viability, allowing the tank crews to find a new confidence in their 
abilities and their position within the army. Both the Tank Corps Workshops, as an internal feature 
of the Corps, and the improving coordination of non-tank divisions with tank movements reflected 
the strength of the Tank Corps, earning them the support they had lacked in 1916.  
As the war entered 1918, various developments attached to the tank had made their way 
into official training courses. Newly commissioned officers, collected at Bovington for training in 
tank and gunnery courses, went through training in using the fascines and unditching beam, 
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reflecting the speed with which developments in tank warfare were picked up by the entire corps. 
Like with trainees in earlier years, trainees in 1918 also were trained in both driving and gunnery. 
However, with more opportunities to go into action and enough tanks to justify the presence of 
tank battalions at multiple areas on the front, trainees also had the chance to learn from tank 
veterans more consistently than in earlier years. There was more to learn, with the changes made 
in tank designs and the additions of fascines, but the Tank Corps retained the support it needed 
from men at the front, providing feedback to the Tank Corps Workshops and the training camps 
alike to refine the crews and their tools. 
The use of smaller raids also helped the tanks prove themselves to infantry divisions, as 
well as providing opportunities to refine coordination between the two groups and for tank crews 
to familiarize themselves with the tanks and their other tools. Even for men who saw little action, 
like John Wainwright of the 8
th
 Tank Battalion, the emphasis of the link between the tanks and the 
infantry still shone through in minor movements. Though Wainwright never participated in a major 
tank battle, like that of Cambrai, his position as a tank section lieutenant allowed him to see how 
commanders directed the tanks to move on a position and clear out lanes for the infantry to 
follow, thus accomplishing minor but successful pushes along the line.
147
 Though Wainwright 
lacked dramatic milestones like Bullecourt or Cambrai to mark his progress, the contributions of 
the tanks were visible to their crews, who found the steady, incremental movement of smaller 
raids just as encouraging as major pushes. Again, Fuller’s confidence in his tank tactics found 
fruit on the Western Front, and lent further credibility to the tank crews and commanders alike. 
When infantry commanders coordinated with the tanks, progress was visible, encouraging the 
infantry to work more closely with the tanks in further operations. 
Idle moments of 1918 also saw incidents where tank men would occupy themselves with 
a specifically tank-derived sport: by shooting houses, they could knock slates off the roofs and 
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thus devise a rough point system.
148
 Though this game was unlikely to be popular for long, its 
invention indicated how the tank men had become familiar enough with their tanks to take some 
liberties. The tanks were as crucial to the tank crews as the crew members themselves, and their 
various features could inspire joy as well as admiration. The crews had survived Passchendaele 
to earn the glories of Cambrai, and were confident in their training, their organization, and their 
tanks. 
 
Amiens and New Models 
David Fletcher, in describing the Battle of Amiens, called the battle the “final blow” from 
which the German Army never recovered.
149
 While the battle itself was an impressive example of 
the use of tanks, the battle is more interesting from a personal perspective since it added new 
vehicles to the class of “tank,” and required some reorganization of men and machines. The Tank 
factories began manufacturing Mark V and Mark V Star models, in which improvements to the 
steering mechanisms allowed the new models to be driven by one driver instead of three. Mark V 
Star tanks were also longer by two to three feet, which enabled them to climb out of trenches 
more effectively.
150
 Whippet tanks appeared in action and supply/gun-carrier tanks carried 
sledges of materials and heavy artillery guns, forming a slower yet still mobile platform from which 
artillery and other tank divisions could source their supplies.
151
  
Interestingly, the men of the tank crews made little distinction between the Whippets and 
the earlier Mark IVs and Vs, despite the differences in ability and firepower. Since the Whippets 
came at such an apparently late stage, it may have been easier to simply refer to all tank models 
as “tanks,” but for the tank crews, this lack of distinction also reveals their form of attachment. 
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The tank crews were not defined by the model of tank that they used: they were set apart merely 
because of the fact that they were driving a tank. This was also clear in other tank crews that lost 
their tanks to shelling or fire, and were deeply hurt by the loss. This was not the attachment of a 
cavalryman to his horse, since the ratio was different (a tank crew would be at least two men in a 
Whippet, and usually six in a Model IV or V), but the tank crews took responsibility for their tanks 
in a deeply personal fashion.  
The tank crews continued to find ways to emphasize their attention to their tanks, as well 
as their own feelings towards the tanks. When tanks were destroyed in early actions, some 
members described a bitter envy towards crews whose tanks remained functional. For the 6
th
 
Battalion, their new assignments to the Whippet tanks provoked interest in the new models, as 
well as a kind of excited joy at being able to crew the new models.
152
 The speed of the Whippets 
reduced the stresses of getting into position or maneuvering the tanks once in place, and since 
the Whippets were also comparatively smaller than earlier models, the clumsiness of the Mark 
IVs and Vs was barely present in the movements of the Whippets. Another important change was 
that the Whippet tanks coordinated with the cavalry, not with the infantry. The primary reason for 
this decision was the difference in speed, since the Whippets could maintain faster speeds and 
keep pace with the cavalry.
153
 
The effect of the Whippets was limited in the Battle of Amiens, mainly since their 
coordination with cavalry was judged (by the tank men) to be a failure. Though the Whippet tanks 
were faster than their earlier counterparts, they still could not keep up with cavalry moving at a full 
gallop, and when the tanks did catch up with the cavalry, they would often push forward while the 
cavalry was cut down by machine gun fire.
154
 As with the early battles fought in Mark I tanks, the 
tank crews were forced to rethink their own place on the battlefield and how the tanks might be 
used most effectively, especially if they were to fight alongside Mark V tanks in the same action. 
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Using heavy tanks to accompany infantry had been a strategy that saw success at Cambrai and, 
when applied correctly, in other battles, but the light Whippet tanks left the Battle of Amiens 
without clear confirmation of their role. That they were useful was not in question, thanks to their 
speed and movement capabilities, but in this case, innovation was not enough to produce 
success. The men of the new Whippet battalions could do little but wait until tactics, whether from 
infantry, tanks, or cavalry, managed to provide a clear role for Whippets to fulfill. 
The employment of gun-carrier tanks gave some tank crews the chance to explore 
alternative uses of the tanks, since the gun-carrier or supply tanks had been altered and were fit 
for fighting. Instead of facing action on the front lines, these tanks took a less dangerous position, 
shuttling supplies to the artillery and staying well within British lines. Officer Bertram Steward felt 
that the role of a supply tank was a “piece of cake,” especially in comparison with the duties of the 
infantry, and even such catastrophes as a tank fire were easily overcome with quick reactions 
and adequate fire extinguishers.
155
 “We didn’t do anything brave or exciting, not really.”
156
 The 
supply tanks did prove effective at unditching Whippet tanks, namely because the supply tanks 
were so much heavier than the small Whippets, and so the men of the supply tanks found 
themselves in a different position than the men of the Whippets or the Mark V tanks. Commander 
Watson, having been transferred from his company and assigned to the 4
th
 Infantry Carrier 
Company, slowly realized the change in duties that came with his movement from a company of 
heavy tanks to a company of supply tanks. Though the role of the supply tanks was a significant 
change from the role of “fighting tanks,” Watson managed to find some valor in potentially 
becoming part of “that splendid Corps, the Royal Army Service Corps.”
157
 Navigating the conflict 
between a tank crew’s identity as “fighting troops” and their real utility in the tanks was a 
bittersweet moment for tank crews assigned to the supply tanks. Apparently General Elles 
recognized this conflict too late, for he made a somewhat contradictory compliment to Watson’s 
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company upon their arrival in France: “General Elles can never have realized how he broke our 
hearts, when he inspected us on our arrival, by telling the three proud company commanders that 
the men were too good for the Carrier Companies.”
158
 Instead of defining themselves by brave 
heroics, the supply tanks and their crews became instead part of the mechanism of the B.E.F. 
lines, following behind other divisions and finding utility in supporting artillery guns and providing  
supply dumps for other tanks to refuel and resupply. In the months of 1918, the progressive 
offensive of the B.E.F. allowed for continual advancement, and the supply tanks were thus at their 
best as artillery guns and other tank battalions were being continually moved forward.  
In the heat of the battle, particularly in the larger operation at Amiens, the supply tanks 
did experience some action, but as a periphery to the main battle. Fires were more common, as 
particularly accurate shells would puncture petrol tanks and ignite the petrol within. Though 
Steward considered the actions of the supply tanks as rarely heroic, the drama of the battle of 
Amiens was enough for a second lieutenant of the 1
st
 Gun-Carrier Company to be awarded the 
Military Cross.
159
 This company specifically lost fourteen supply tanks to shelling, and the 
highlight of the battle was the rush to remove tanks from the scene of the fire. In this instance, the 
supply tanks seemed more like their artillery counterparts than their other tank comrades: their 
greater fear was shelling from enemy artillery, located at quite a distance and impossible for them 
to engage, and the worries of coordinating with infantry were nearly nonexistent. These tank men 
still considered themselves part of the world of the tanks—they were part of the Tank Corps, 
reported to other tank men, and corresponded with Tank Corps productions—but the 
development of supply tanks allowed their crews to define themselves not only by action but also 
by the more mundane duties of supply and the rear-line positions of stationary artillery. 
The Battle of Amiens also allowed the tank crews to form new (or to renew old) 
connections with specific groups. Across a number of accounts, the Australians earned the most 
accolades from tank men, even with the disappointments of Bullecourt and Watson’s irritation at 
                                                          
158
 Watson, A Company of Tanks, Chapter XIV. 
 
159
 Fletcher, Tanks and Trenches, 140. 
 73 
 
the lack of faith from Australian infantry.
160
 Canadian divisions and a division of Highlanders took 
part with the tanks in various battles, but in comparison with the Australians, the Canadians 
proved to have little experience with tank coordination, and the Highlanders only had a few 
opportunities to fight alongside tanks before moving to other parts of the front.  
The news of the arrival of American soldiers also provoked some interest, although the 
greater interest would come when the 301
st
 Battalion was formed, providing the United States 
Army with a collection of Mark V tanks to work in concert with the British Tank Corps. The British 
tank crews viewed their American counterparts with a mixture of amusement and affection, 
working to train the Americans in the use of the Mark V tanks to prepare them for action.
161
 While 
tank crews were not immune to feelings of resentment that the Americans had delayed entering 
the war for so long, they were nonetheless excited to introduce their tanks to new users, and 
congratulated those American crews who took the training to heart. 
Though Commander William Watson also worked closely with supply tanks as part of his 
command, the events of Amiens were a dramatic spectacle in Watson’s understanding of the 
Tank Corps. Not only did the tanks perform effectively, they were as much the stars of the battle 
as they were at Cambrai, and perhaps more so: their newfound variety allowed different tanks to 
earn merit in different ways, and the development of light tanks seemed to Watson “to put the 
cavalry in the grave.”
162
 Even with Bertram Steward’s claim that there were no “heroics” among 
supply tanks, Watson recounted a number of his own tanks who managed to use their single gun 
to provide cover for infantry, or who accompanied divisions into the thick of battle to supply 
needed ammunition. Some disappointment was a consequence of the deployment of anti-tank 
guns by the German artillery, and each action resulted in the loss of tanks either to direct shell 
hits or to fires. Despite their problems, Watson took great pride in his company of supply tanks 
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and labeled his men “indefatigable,”
163
 especially since supply companies were using older 
models of tanks (usually Mark IVs with some guns removed to make room for supplies) and often 
had fewer men than a fighting company. Though not as spectacular as the battle of Cambrai, the 
battle of Amiens was a significant triumph for the tanks, and since the battle was the beginning of 
the Hundred Days leading to the Armistice, most memoirs and histories recorded the battle as 
part of the final push towards victory. Watson’s memoir was particularly poignant, since he had 
moved from the 5
th
 Company and its retinue of experienced men to the less-prestigious 4
th
 
Supply Company, and witnessed for the second time how the pressures of battle shaped a 
company’s identity and gave mere trainees the experience to work as a unit.  
 
Aftermath 
The reaction of the tank crews to the news of the armistice was not significantly different 
from the reaction of non-tank soldiers: in tank accounts, the primary emotions were those of relief 
and joy, the hope of returning home and the triumphant celebrations that broke out spontaneously 
across the front. Watson’s account of leaving his company was as bittersweet as his earlier 
departure from his infantry division in 1917, but his position of command gave him a particularly 
compelling perspective on demobilization: 
I was desperately sorry to leave my men and my tanks. It must break the heart of 
a man to retire from a famous regiment in which he has spent his life, but the 
regiment continues to live. A Carrier Company was a humble, temporary unit in a 
vast organisation, a momentary improvisation. Like every other Company, it had 
found itself and created its own personality. It had fought for its existence against 
the ignorance and laughter of the more conservative elements in the Tank Corps. 
I knew that soon the remnants of the Company would return home and the 
Company finally be dissolved. Yet there it was —  something which I had 
"formed" though not created. From an odd crowd of men with a few obsolete 
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tanks and some cases of equipment it had become a "Company" of whose 
honour we were jealous, whose achievements we extolled, whom all of us could 
leave only with lasting regret....
164
 
The greater drama for the Tank Corps after the Armistice took place not at the company 
or battalion level, but at the administrative level. It was commanders like Major Fuller, General 
Elles, and Commander Hotblack who concerned themselves with the organization of the tank 
battalions after the Armistice. A significant reduction in numbers compelled most of the tank 
crewmen to return to civilian lives, sometimes maintaining their friendships or correspondence 
with other tank men regardless of occupation. A small portion of men who remained with the 
Corps would go on to see action in the Second World War, having become the veterans they so 
admired in the early days of the tank regiment. A return to civilian lives, and the establishment of 
families, allowed tank men to begin sharing their experiences with new audiences and in new 
ways, and the efforts of family historians and public histories today reflect the willingness of tank 
men to discuss their experiences. For those willing to give interviews, their time in the Tank Corps 
was defined only partially by the tanks: they never forgot their connections to the infantry and 
their relationships within the crews. Their training and their tanks set them apart, due the unique 
pressures of fighting inside the tanks, but the experiences of the tank crews were not dramatically 
different from the variety of impressions from other front-line combatants. In Bion, the onset of 
severe melancholy, even depression, testified to the fact that being in the Tank Corps was no 
escape from the horror of the battlefield; for a man like Arthur Jenkin, his patriotism and presence 
in the war allowed him to make claim to a particular kind of military honor, meaning that his time 
with the tanks had not diminished his attachment to his country or to his own pride. Forging a unit 
identity among tank crews was not a straightforward exercise, nor was it the product of a specific 
course, battle, or movement. The mechanical nature of the tanks first attracted men to their ranks, 
the education and training given at tank schools reinforced connections in the crews, and the 
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pressures of coordinating in battle produced tank crews whose lives revolved around their tanks, 
yet could still (and did still) share the trauma and glory of non-tank men.  
  
 77 
 
CHAPTER 3 
As British administrators and designers made the tanks into a viable military reality, and 
as the tank crews developed unit cohesion and battlefield victories, they were not the only groups 
interacting with the tanks. The tanks made headlines in British newspapers the week they saw 
action on the Somme, and the British public was exposed to tank news over and over as 
newspapers reported on these novel inventions. The tanks were not merely a momentary item of 
note, either: the months between their first action at the Somme and the completion of the 
armistice saw a number of tank stories, tank souvenirs, and tank fundraising campaigns working 
to engage British civilians with the tanks. Even without detailed technical, tactical, or personal 
knowledge of the tanks, civilians were provided with numerous opportunities to examine the tanks 
and form their own opinions. Newspapers worked to contextualize the tanks with both war stories 
and photographs, and the Tank Bank fundraising campaign helped to emphasize the connections 
made between tanks and the war effort, bringing tanks to the home front in a tangible way. 
Newspapers provided a multitude of articles and documents which were available to 
British civilians, and the stories they chose and images they featured helped to condense the war 
into readable portions for their readers. Letters from private soldiers were a rare and personal 
resource, meaning that most civilians relied on newspapers to provide information about the 
events of the war.
165
 Consequently, if the press chose not to report on major events or avoided 
certain topics, the general public would have no information about those ignored milestones.
166
 
Though newspapers were also subject to influence from their editors and, ultimately, the 
government, most newspapers kept in line with government expectations for reporting and rarely 
encountered significant censorship. However, this did not mean they were always truthful or 
direct: to appeal to both their government and their readers, many newspapers chose their topics 
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selectively to avoid the censor’s investigation.
167
 Additionally, tank souvenirs provided material 
reminders of the tanks, and the various forms of these souvenirs allowed civilians to view tanks 
repeatedly in their daily lives. The production of a war film featuring the tanks allowed civilians to 
view the movement of the tanks, but the arrival of the tanks in the Tank Bank war bond campaign 
provided opportunities for civilians to see and touch the tanks directly. Through newspapers, 
souvenirs, and the Tank Bank campaigns, tanks were presented to civilian audiences as positive 
aspects of the war effort: humorous, entertaining, and interesting.  
 
Tanks in Print 
For the people of England, the tank was at first a well-kept secret. The men who worked 
on the tank prototypes were sworn to secrecy by the Munitions Department, and the name itself 
was an attempt to convince anyone who saw the huge metal containers that they were merely 
water tanks being shipped to Russia.
168
 On the front, rumors of a “hush-hush” group lent another 
name to the early tanks.
169
 Recruitment was done covertly, through currently existing squadrons 
and organizations, and training grounds were closely monitored to avoid unnecessary 
observation.
170
 However, once the tanks rolled into action at Flers-Courcelette, it was difficult to 
suppress knowledge of their existence any further.  
The opinion of High Command, at least regarding the public image of the tanks, took a 
drastic turn after 1916. Their secrecy through 1916 had made it difficult for the early tank men, 
working on the Landships Committee or through the Munitions Department, to request or receive 
supplies as needed. However, with the deployment of tanks on the Somme, war correspondents 
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and newspapers journalists began reporting on the tanks with a mixture of awe and amusement. 
Like the soldiers who first saw them, the authors who saw the tanks in action found humor in the 
shuffling, “ambling” movements of the tanks, attempting to communicate this humor to their 
readers by comparing the tanks to monsters or “tame pachyderms.”
171
 Though the various 
newspaper accounts included information about the actual attacks, authors also included the 
humorous aspects of the tanks and relayed first-hand impressions alongside the testimonies of 
other soldiers and tank men. There was no need to artificially inflate the success of the tanks, for 
the journalistic appeal of the tanks was not necessarily their ability to win battles. Instead, it was 
the story of a few interesting events, like the entry to Flers-Courcelette, coupled with humorous 
anecdotes about the tanks’ movement and climbing abilities, which produced engaging stories.
172
  
Though some authors hinted at the need to keep some details of the tanks a British 
secret, other correspondents eagerly explained the construction and advantages of the tanks, 
relaying their wholly British manufacture and explaining the caterpillar tracks that encircled the 
tanks. Few of the early development issues were visible in the newspaper accounts which 
reached readers at home in Britain. Instead, the ability of tanks to move and drive over the 
shelled ground of the battlefield inspired praise from correspondents with a “motorist’s 
appreciation,” and prompted the observation that “they are a further proof that England’s 
craftsmen are still the ‘handy Jacks’ of yore in this engineers’ war of ruthless destruction.”
173
 The 
tanks were identified as one of the “great war weapons,” with an author noting with pride their 
British, rather than German, origin. “The last-named [the tank] may be imitated by the Germans, 
but we shall meantime undoubtedly go one better, for we are altogether a quicker people when 
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once we put our back into it.”
174
 In 1916, it was still vital to reinforce British superiority, and the 
tanks allowed for an easy connection between mechanical ability and military dominance.  
Tanks were also incorporated into the ongoing discussion to define “civilized” and 
“uncivilized” forms of warfare, a debate that had begun in British newspapers early in the war. 
British authors found that the tanks were “perfectly proper weapons of war,” while the Germans 
had crossed some barbaric line by utilizing poisonous gas and submarine attacks.
175
 While the 
tanks were a testament to British ingenuity, they were also a reinforcement of British civility, at 
least after the newspaper authors had been able to add their interpretation to the events. British 
newspapers tended to focus on perceived German brutality with mawkish attention, a pattern now 
termed “atrocity reporting” that had developed over the first two years of the war to identify 
German nature as the root cause of the war atrocities. By 1916, correspondents and editors were 
not hesitant to identify German culture itself, or their misunderstanding of “Kultur”, as their real 
enemy, meaning that the tanks fell neatly into a pre-existing narrative to reinforce British 
superiority.
176
 Praising British soldiers provided an easy transition for authors to compliment 
British tanks. “The deciding factor is the quality of the men. We have at last shown our superiority 
in inventing war machinery, as is proved by the ‘tanks.’”
177
 When correspondent Sir William 
Beach Thomas published his book, With the British on the Somme, with an entire chapter 
devoted to the first actions of the tanks, he also utilized the concept of British mechanical ability to 
encourage his readers, positioning British mechanics as the forward-thinking counterparts of 
German chemists. “The Tank—lowly, heavy, obscure, noisy, variable—plods on, and will remain 
a high tribute to British mechanical skill. We answered in mechanics to the enemy’s chemical 
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innovations. Doubtless the Germans are good chemists, but there is no novelty in any of the 
chemical devices used in this war.”
178
  
 Though mechanically complex, the first tanks took the simple shape of a tilted rhombus, 
meaning that their image could be easily copied down with a few straight lines. Unlike organic 
subjects, tanks were smooth, flat, and angular, making them easy to draw and easy to recognize. 
One did not need complicated technical knowledge to identify a tank: tanks had an easily-
recognizable silhouette simply because of their size and shape. Even as the war persisted, tank 
imagery continued to be popular. The visual impact of the tanks dominated discussions about 
them, and allowed newspapers, commercial vendors, and artists alike to capitalize on the 
civilian’s desire to see the tanks in reality. As early as September 1916, writers hinted at the 
possibility of seeing model tanks on display in storefront windows, and wondering whether tanks 
might be included in the annual Lord Mayor’s show in London.
179
 The tanks would indeed be 
present in the Lord Mayor's show, though not until November of 1917, and were the centerpiece 
of newspaper photographs of the event.
180
  
By 1917, the tanks were recognizable enough for the Mackintosh’s Toffee Company to 
run advertisements claiming that “Tommy wants a TANK-FULL.”
181
 Wright’s Coal Tar Soap 
published an advertisement featuring a tank that had soap bars in place of its tread tracks,
182
 and 
the Daimler Company began to boast of its engines as being “the original POWER UNIT of the 
tank.”
183
 In a more personal advertisement, the Humber Car company proclaimed that the men of 
the tanks would “find peace, comfort, and solace once more in touring the country roads of 
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England in a post war ‘Humber’ car.”
184
 Other groups also saw the value in referencing tanks, as 
the tanks were included in National Service recruitment advertisements boldly proclaiming that 
“This is an engineer’s war.”
185
 In both a visual sense and in connection with the war, tanks gained 
specific connotations that advertisers used and encouraged to reach civilian audiences. 
Though British newspapers rarely had the space or insight to evaluate the tanks 
tactically, as Major Fuller or Sir Liddell Hart would do in their books and papers, newspaper 
articles managed to keep pace with the various concerns and ideas being circulated around the 
tank. Without detailed knowledge of the production or numbers of the tanks available, 
newspapers focused on the tanks in action, relating the attributes of the tanks as a laundry list of 
their advantages. Tanks could compress barbed wire, making paths for the infantry;
186
 tanks 
could overcome trenches with ease, maintaining forward momentum;
187
 tanks could provide 
covering fire from their Lewis and Hotchkiss guns, taking down German machine gun nests and 
rescuing the infantry from the ongoing rain of machine gun bullets.
188
 At times, newspapers 
praised the tanks beyond reasonable expectation, going above and beyond in their descriptions 
to explain the might, power, and majesty of the tanks. 
Rather than detailing the abstract technical minutiae or the theoretical tactical 
applications of the tanks, authors preferred the personal testimonies of tank men, many of which 
reinforced earlier characterizations of the tanks as funny, easy-going animals. Though authors did 
not pit cavalry against the tanks as Fuller did, they invited comparisons between tanks and their 
non-mechanical counterparts—and between the tank crews and their non-mechanical 
compatriots.  
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They know the points of a ‘Tank’ as you know, or think you know, the points of a horse, 
and they love the Willies and know them to be beautiful…they were foregathered with the 
Willies in the field, testing them, playing around with them, cruising about the obstacle 
course, and generally consolidating that intimacy which makes one thing of a man and 
his machine, one family of a ship and her crew.
189
  
The men of the tanks were not so different from cavalry men, or from sailors, or even from other 
soldiers: their experiences and their attachments gained context from references to other 
branches of the Army or Navy.  
Newspaper correspondents, working both from personal experience and from the 
testimonials of soldiers, wandered between presenting the tank as a monster and presenting the 
tank as a marvelous joke. “Pantomime and Pure Horror;”
190
 “The Flers ‘Stunt’;”
191
 “Our Newest 
Monster:”
192
 newspaper headlines repeatedly emphasized both the terrifying aspects of the tanks 
and their theatrical comedic aspects. The tanks earned attention for their military exploits in the 
press, but beyond their military application, authors identified them as a comic element.  
The Tanks have supplied the touch of comic relief and excited the mirth of the British 
soldier, always blessed with a keen sense of the ridiculous. They acted as an antidote to 
the effect of the ‘Jack Johnsons,’ ‘Weary Willies,’ ‘Silent Susies,’ ‘Whizz Bangs,’ 
“Sausages,’ ‘Rum Jars,’ tear shells, gas shells, and all the other frightfulnesses of the 
unspeakable Boche. They counteracted the weariness, the hunger and thirst, the dust, 
the mud, and all the squalor and filthy discomfort of war.
193
 
Because the tanks were British, authors could find them comedic and inspiring all at once, 
developing a meaning for British readers through the adjectives and metaphors applied to them. 
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Thomas also echoed these sentiments in his book, where a quotation from Lewis 
Carroll’s Through the Looking-Glass provided the absurd descriptions of early tanks: “’the 
Jabberwock with eyes of flame’ who ‘came waffling through the tulgey wood/and burbled as it 
came.’”
194
 For Thomas, the contrast between the chaos of the battlefield and the serenity of the 
tanks, impassive and unemotional as they were, heightened his sense of the ridiculous. Tanks 
required crews, of course, “tough little men” to coordinate their gears and man the guns, but once 
the doors were closed, those crews were invisible to outside observers, giving the tank a form of 
mechanical life while hiding any human effort.
195
 To emphasize the British origin of the tanks, 
Thomas chose not to utilize Biblical or biological references to define the tanks in his account, but 
reached for a specifically British literary reference. Using Through the Looking-Glass indicated 
that Thomas was directing his comments at an audience that would understand this reference 
and understand the joke. From their arrival on the battlefield to their final push, Thomas repeated 
the image of the tanks as objects of amusement, relating them to British audiences by quoting a 
familiar reference. 
Neither was the humor lost in other interpretations. Songs and pantomimes allowed 
civilians to memorialize events in casual, light-hearted ways, and the most popular of these 
songs, “Take Me Back to Dear Old Blighty,” remained a staple in British war references 
throughout the twentieth century. Though not as popular, “The Tanks that Broke the Ranks (out in 
Picardy)” was a similar song that gained popularity in the winter of 1916 through Fred Curran’s 
pantomime tour. As the tanks of reality accomplished little on the Western Front, languishing in 
their need for supplies and trained men, the tanks of pantomime promised a breakthrough in 
movement and a quick resolution to the war: after their joyride through Picardy, it was merely 
“tuppence all the way from here to Berlin!”
196
 Comedians constructed mock tanks for stage use, 
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unknowingly mimicking the tank crews on their training fields as they staged their battles with 
false tanks of wood and canvas.
197
 A marionette show included both tanks and battleships as the 
“chief figures of a patriotic scene,”
198
 and dancers adapted the tanks into routines for touring 
shows.
199
  
A later addition to items of tank media involved the publication of a poem by A.A. Milne, 
the author who would later gain notoriety for his creation of Winnie the Pooh. The poem itself, 
though untitled, listed the features of tanks as part of an expression of gratitude, ending with an 
expressive “THANKS!” At the same time, Milne also included references to the crews of the 
tanks, applying his gratitude equally to the men who worked in the tank crews. “But they’re not 
quite mechanical Tanks/There are men at the wheel and the gun.”
200
 Without the mathematical 
comparisons of man-power to machine power, or the cost-saving arguments presented by Major-
Colonel Fuller, Milne presented the tanks as additions to the inherent strength, diligent, and ability 
of the British army. The tanks required crews, and so despite their mechanical nature, would 
always remain “not quite mechanical.” Another line claimed “No, it isn’t all fun in the Tanks:/You 
may read with a cheer/How they crashed down the wire,/But perhaps you don’t hear/That a 
couple caught fire – “; that the tanks were exciting was clear to Milne, but his effort was directed 
at reminding readers of the human elements of tank warfare, and the real dangers therein.  
Newspapers were not always limited to mere textual descriptions to describe the visual 
appeal of the tanks. Before photographs were made available to the press, correspondents and 
artists had to fill the visual void, working from eyewitness reports to present the tanks in sketches. 
Descriptions could give some guidance to artists, but there was little reference material for artists 
to utilize. One artist, drawing on the colorful reports of the tanks rather than searching for a 
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realistic perspective, drew a collection of animal-like vehicles exaggerating one feature or another 
from the various press accounts. One “tank” resembled a hedgehog bristling with guns; another a 
crouching frog with wheels; a third complete with a tail behind it to evoke the silhouette of a shark 
or dinosaur. (Figure 1.)
201
 An even more absurd contraption was published in the Liverpool Echo, 
with wheels with tracked treads and compartments like a train; a “face” like that of an animal, 
complete with a tree in the “mouth” of the tank, attempted to convey the tanks’ capacity to 
overcome obstacles, though taken to an extreme. (Figure 2.)
202
 Though their military purpose was 
vital to their existence, the tanks entered the civilian world with less serious imagery. This did not 
detract from their popularity, however: if anything, the amusing features of early reports and 
cartoons allowed audiences to enjoy the tanks despite the fact that they had accomplished little 
on the battlefield. . Early tank battles in 1916 rarely replicated the breakthrough of September, 
and so it was that in the press that the tanks earned greater accomplishments through interesting 
imagery rather than their technical strengths. 
 
Figure 1. A few conceptions, picked up from Press accounts here and there, of what the “tanks” 
are really like.
203
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Figure 2. Our artist’s fanciful drawing of the new motor ‘tank’. It is depicted in the act of enjoying a 
snack in the shape of a tree as it approaches the enemy trenches.
204 
 
In late November and early December of 1916, photographs began to reach newspapers 
in a rush, allowing for the publication of dramatic headlines above the images of tanks in action. 
When a picture failed to include anything of sufficient visual excitement, captions easily supplied 
fuel for a viewer’s imagination: “The Tanks have been described as able to knock down houses 
and trees, and crawl over trenches and shell-craters, spitting fire, and impervious to anything but 
a direct hit from a big shell.”
205
 While technically true, this description failed to communicate the 
slow speed of the tanks, the mechanical difficulties that accompanied their movement, and the 
problems in steering that made tanks an occasional danger to their own lines. Though smoke and 
fog were easily found on the Western Front, their inclusion in tank photographs often lent a 
mysterious air to the new figures. Caption authors eagerly pointed out the clouds of smoke, 
attempting to indicate to their viewers how the sight of a tank looming out of the smoke could 
provoke superstitious terror among German opponents.
206
 Photographs did not shy away from 
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capturing the monstrous elements of tank designs, but the earlier notes of humor and the patriotic 
tone of early reports helped to contextualize the monstrosity in positive, beneficial ways. When 
photographs were not available, drawings sufficed, usually sketching the outline of the tank 
faithfully but occasionally adding bulk to various areas of the tank’s trapezoidal profile. One 
publication, The Graphic, in a humorous twist, published an issue with pictures of water tanks, 
noting the pressure of the censor but confident that there remained some “tanks” they could 
photograph freely.
207
 Though the tanks began as a secret development, newspapers and other 
publications found ways to discuss them and portray them, adding new interpretations to their 
depictions as they explained the tanks to their British readers. 
 
Material Goods 
Models, whether professionally made or carved by amateur enthusiasts, reflected the 
intense popularity of the tank image, visible in private collections to this day. Collectors Bill Howell 
and Barbara Jones claim that “Their popularity is demonstrated by the fact that, of all the hand-
made souvenirs we have found, there are more representing tanks than any other weapon, and 
the Crest industry made more versions of the tank than of anything else.”
208
 Crest, or crested 
china, was a popular form of model-making that began in the Victorian period to provide 
memorabilia to a British citizenry just beginning to enjoy the advantages of regular travel. To 
remember their holidays, vacationers sought small mementos to keep for themselves, but these 
mementos had to be inexpensive if they were to appeal to wide audiences. China manufacturers 
thus developed small models that could be easily replicated and mass-produced. Though the first 
china products were simply plates or medallions with a local coat-of-arms painted on them, by 
1916 china models (of people, buildings, or even machinery) were a popular form of collector’s 
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item.
209
 When the first accounts of tanks were published in late September, the Arcadian China 
company registered a model within the week, getting their patent number by the 27
th
 of that 
month. However, a lack of photographic references meant that the first model was absurdly 
proportioned, completed with a bulbous turret and too-small tracks.
210
  
As information about the tanks reached eager audiences, tank models began to flood the 
market, offering customers tanks as commemorative memorabilia or as practical household 
items. Though china tanks had little practical value, metal and wooden models could serve a 
number of purposes, including as jewelry boxes, paperweights, watch holders, inkwells, 
pincushions, and game pieces.
211
 A design for a tank brooch appeared in May 1917, bringing 
tanks into the realm of jewelry and fashion.
212
 By Christmas of 1917, the Tank Corps had been 
provided with their own badge, which joined other badges in the Christmas offerings of “badge 
brooches” on sale that year.
213
 Designers churned out tank products as fast as their imaginations 
could carry them, and British citizens purchased, used, and saved their products.  
Tanks as toys proved incredibly popular, namely because they could be constructed in 
miniature to closely resemble the real thing. Models produced in 1916 also enjoyed the most 
exaggerated imaginative designs, as photographs of the tanks did not reach toy designers or their 
audiences until late that year. Tanks captured the same interest as toy cars, while including the 
guns that made it a weapon rather than a mere vehicle. Tanks as toys provided no dramatic 
break or diversion from toys of the war years, but they were indicative of the trends in British 
entertainment. In her article on the topic, Margaret Higonnet identifies dolls and toys as methods 
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by which children entered a “culture of war” alongside their parents.
214
 While cartoons, 
photographs, and public displays had primarily adult audiences, toys and games were specifically 
designed for children, catering to a desire to educate children in the meaning and methods of 
war. The book Children’s Culture and the First World War goes even further in presenting 
children’s novels as further areas of education, constructing heroism through clear, child-oriented 
narratives. Though toys had been part of human experience since ancient times, the late 
nineteenth century in Europe saw the creation and expansion of a toy industry, with serious study 
focusing on the design and adoption of toys beginning at the turn of the century.
215
 Children as an 
audience, defined separately and with different needs than their parents, presented the 
manufacturers of the First World War with alternate ways to interpret current events. Children had 
already been attentive to the interest of their parents in the tanks: one schoolteacher stated that 
“her girls expected her to explain the kind of instrument the new war ‘tanks’ were,”
216
 and the “up-
to-date child” praised the production of toy tanks in time for Christmas of 1916.
217
 Thus the tank 
was condensed, miniaturized, and marketed for children, including them in the tank’s audience.  
This movement was not surprising for onlookers at the time: in November 1916, with 
Christmas fast approaching, the Leeds Mercury was proud to report that “patriotic little hearts will 
not be grieved to find the legend ‘Made in Germany’ attached to any of their presents,” and an 
extended review of available gifts assured shoppers that each type of soldier was available in 
miniature for the purposes of “miniature warfare.”
218
 Toy suppliers were already producing 
caterpillar tanks to keep up with the “latest features.”
219
 Aberdeen’s Evening Express promised 
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“imitations of the much-talked of tanks” at Christmas toy fairs,
220
 and The Mercury advertised 
dolls which could be “run over with a Tank without spoiling their complexion.”
221
 Primus 
Engineering sets promised the opportunity to not only play with a model tank, but the chance to 
build it oneself.
222
  
 
Figure 3. A photograph of a model tank being prepared for exhibition.
223
 
 
The onset of Christmas also prompted the advertisement of picture books, granting 
artists their chance to bring the tanks into the homes of everyday Britons. The War Office  had 
commissioned artist Muirhead Bone to make sketches of the Western Front, but his work had 
little tactical or strategic purpose: instead, his sketches were published in a small booklet made 
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available for commercial consumption.
224
 Valentine & Sons, Ltd. offered books with illustrations 
and descriptions with a report that “Her Majesty the Queen favored Messrs. Valentine with an 
order quite recently.”
225
 Pantomime reappeared to play an important part in Christmas 
preparations. In Coventry, a tank replaced the traditional sleigh for Father Christmas, allowing 
him to distribute presents and also “fire” oranges from the tank’s mock guns.
226
 
 
Visual Appeal 
Tank fervor did not abate with the New Year 1917, and a myriorama went on display in 
January of 1917 featuring illustrations of the tanks in action. More than a mere photograph, 
myrioramas followed a long tradition of displays intended to make visual spectacles.
227
 Like the 
diorama, panorama, and its less well-known cousins the cosmorama and the pleorama, the 
myriorama arranged images for maximum effect on their viewer. The myriorama contained a set 
of cards which could be arranged in different orientations to produce different pictures, and in the 
touring show of “Poole’s Myriorama”, audiences could see various war pictures without waiting for 
a war film to be developed. While the news of the tour brought some attention, one author found 
the impact of the illustrations even more striking than a mere photograph might offer. “While it 
brings home to those who are ‘keeping the home fires burning’ how terrible are the methods of 
modern warfare, recommends itself to those who have been in recent ‘pushes’ as giving a most 
realistic presentation of the work of the irresistible, all-defying land Dreadnoughts.”
228
  
Soon enough, the war film Battle of the Ancre and Advance of the Tanks came out in 
British cinemas in February of 1917, presenting an even more dynamic visual for British viewers. 
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Reports on the film overtook actual reports of tanks from the Western Front as audiences flocked 
to showings, and newspaper reviews applauded the fact that the film showed the truth of the war 
while still maintaining a dignified restraint in which pictures were chosen.  Even more so than 
replicas or photographs, film brought the tanks to British audiences in ways not imagined in 
earlier wars. The pressure of a “total war” asked much of a nation, and the proximity of the war 
made it difficult for civilians to ignore the disappointing results as the war persisted. The largest 
civilian draft in British history also meant that civilian men were being pulled out of industry and 
family life to fight, and their families were asked to support the new soldiers individually and as a 
nation. Compelling a nation’s obedience grew increasingly more difficult the longer the war 
continued, and the production of war films used the new medium of film to woo citizens into 
agreement with the military. The involvement of the government allowed, and in fact encouraged, 
the recording of material from the front, but the government’s presence also meant that censors 
and War Office administrators manipulated those recordings before they were presented to 
civilian audiences.  
Geoffery Malins, appointed by the War Office at the opening of the war, produced Battle 
of the Ancre as the second of three official war films, preceded by The Battle of the Somme and 
followed by The German Retreat and the Battle of Arras. Though The Battle of the Somme was 
and remains the most well-known of the three, all three films formed a vital part of British wartime 
propaganda. Newspapers praised The Battle of the Somme as an opportunity for civilians in 
Britain to experience the war for themselves, or at least to grasp a better understanding of the 
war than could be communicated in mere print. Though The Battle of the Somme and its sequels 
lacked sound, cinemas provided live music to accompany the film, and the film itself produced 
intense emotional reactions from its audience.
229
 Soldiers in the trenches were particular 
highlights of both films, but in both The Battle of the Somme and Battle of the Ancre, producers 
highlighted artillery alongside the soldiers, lending artillery pieces narrative agency and giving 
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them credit for the movement of the war. In Stacy Gillis’ examination of these two films, the 
leveling influence of cinema allowed objects to gain equal status with human actors, an influence 
which British war film producers emphasized in order to display artillery as the motive force in the 
war.
230
 The presence of the tanks allowed producers to carry this concept even further: shots no 
longer needed human actors to show movement, since the tanks were capable of movement on 
their own. In one scene, as a tank crew gathered around the tank, they ducked inside through a 
door in the tank’s sponson, disappearing from the camera’s view as the tank itself began to move 
forward.
231
  
Though most reviews of Battle of the Ancre echoed earlier assessments of The Battle of 
the Somme, borrowing the earlier patriotic enthusiasm for the first war film, reviewers were also 
interested in the presentation of the tanks. With this chance to see their movement for the first 
time, audiences noted the same humorous movements first noted by war correspondents and 
tank crews, coupled with observations of how easily the tanks moved over the land.
232
 The mud 
of the Western Front seemed no barrier for the tanks, though other shots illustrated how men and 
horses struggled in the mire of No Man’s Land, following early optimistic visions of the tank in 
reports from the front.
233
  
While consistently entertaining, the tanks never lost a patriotic theme. The Battle of 
Cambrai in 1917 prompted one artist, in the same magazine that had produced the cartoonish 
speculative drawings of 1916, to depict the tanks crushing the dragon of the Saint George myth, 
with Haig himself poised as George atop the tank. In one move, this image reinforced the power 
of the tanks (able to “out-dragon the dragon” with their armor and treads) and their English roots. 
With Saint George the patron saint of England, the reference afforded the tanks further legitimacy 
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as an English tool. In case the message was unclear, the artist also provided Haig-George with a 
shield bearing the flag of England and placed a pickelhaube on the dragon’s head to indicate its 
allegorical German origins.  
 
Figure 4. St. George Out-Dragons the Dragon (with Mr. Punch’s jubilant compliments to Sir 
Douglas Haig and his Tanks). 234 
 
The tank could also serve to encourage patriotism in non-battlefield settings, as indicated 
by the attention given to munitions workers. Though not as flashy or spectacular as battlefield 
drawings, references to industry and factories began to include minor references to tank workers. 
Once the secrecy around the tanks was lifted, tank workers could be identified as participants in 
the tanks’ success and joined the legions of other workers (whether allegorical or literal) in the 
praise afforded to them by newspapers and published artwork.
235
 Encouraging munitions work 
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and industry was vital for a war being waged with such material needs. The British government 
relied on civilian workers and corporations to cooperate with the war effort, even as the war 
extended further and further. Presenting munitions work as inherently patriotic was one path to 
keeping workers at their factories, and tying the tanks to industry gave propagandists a new and 
exciting icon to encourage work on the home front. Tanks, industry, and national feeling all leapt 
at viewers and readers from the pages of their newspapers: where the last two had begun to 
wane, the first could recapture the imagination and resurrect earlier enthusiasm. 
 
Tank Banks 
The initiation of the Tank Bank campaign, a program in the later months of 1917 to raise 
money through the purchase of war bonds, saw an increase in tank souvenirs and material 
goods. To emphasize the financial connections between tanks and war bonds, tank money boxes 
were produced as literal “Tank Banks.” Some banks were china models with slits in them, but 
others were made of wood or metal. Models produced for the Tank Bank campaign often had 
more information about their “parent” tank, stamped or etched with the tank’s number to provide a 
reference to the campaign.
236
 As part of the campaign, the Department of Information sent three 
tanks to various cities throughout Britain to encourage citizens to purchase war bonds. For most 
civilians, this was the first time they would see a tank in person, making the arrival of the tanks an 
occasion of note in many towns.  
The first Tank Bank was unveiled in London, occupying Trafalgar Square with huge 
placards and performances featuring theatrical stars of the day. Engaging Londoners was a multi-
step process, as a procession marched through the streets led by theater and vaudeville 
performers, who then made their public contributions to the Tank Bank while climbing atop the 
tank and reciting poems or songs. George Robey, a music hall performer popular at the time, 
took up a position inside the tank to act as a clerk, recording and accepting payments for war 
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bonds with a theatrical enthusiasm that won over the crowd.
237
 The first day of the London Tank 
Bank saw a collection over 100,000 pounds, 
238
 and a week later, the total collection was over 
two and a half million pounds.
239
 Clearly the tanks had an appeal, for “it is obvious that had it not 
been for this new manner of raising revenue no such sum would have entered the coffers of the 
Treasury.”
240
 As the London campaign ended, finishing with over three million pounds raised, the 
citizens of London were treated to a final farewell, watching the tank start up and roll down the 
street under its own power.
241
  
London was not the only city to enjoy the campaign, and the excitement produced by the 
first week of the campaign in London only served to heighten the anticipation for other cities in the 
planned “Tank Bank” route. Though the campaign originally declared that it was only visiting cities 
with a population greater than 250,000, some towns attempted to lobby to redirect the campaign 
to bring the tanks despite their lower population.
242
 The individual tanks developed a celebrity of 
their own, and though papers originally referred to them merely by their number, they soon 
switched to using the nicknames assigned to the various tanks: “Julian.” “Nelson,” and “Egbert.”  
The Tank Bank campaign also provided the opportunity for various cities to engage in 
light-hearted competition. As the tanks made their way from city to city, each local newspaper 
reported on the current standing of the closest competitors, comparing the total amounts raised 
between cities and sometimes calculating the total contribution per capita. While reinforcing local 
pride, in much the same way as sporting events allowed cities and communities to rally around 
single events, the Tank Banks also convinced British citizens to affirm the nation as a whole 
through their financial contributions and through their attention to the Tank Bank events. “By 
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beating us, you will beat the Germans,” wrote one mayor to another in a public telegram, ensuring 
that the competition remained friendly by remembering their real competitors.
243
 
There was little attempt to subconsciously convince citizens of the goodness of the state 
or of the war: the tanks were explicitly products of a British war effort, and the money they raised 
went to a British War Office. “What they saw was its conversion from a death-dealing instrument 
on a big scale into a commercial agency—into a bank with the Government at the back of it 
offering to accept any amount of money on loan on security of a gilt-edged character and at a 
reasonable rate of interest.”
244
 Some tactical features of the tanks, like their ability to conserve 
manpower or protect the infantry, filtered through to Tank Bank investors, as some women 
purchased war bonds from the tanks with a public proclamation that their purchases would “help 
other girls to get their sweethearts back quickly.”
245
 To memorialize their donation, these women 
planned to have their bond certificates framed, making the bonds themselves a demonstration of 
patriotic support beyond their financial application. Whatever the feelings towards the war might 
have been in private, the Tank Banks provided an opportunity and an increasing obligation to 
reaffirm the war effort in a casual, hopeful, and even celebratory atmosphere. 
Bringing a tank into a town or city was no small task. Though members of the National 
War Savings Committee from London led the main campaign, each town was required to form a 
Tank Bank Committee in preparation for the tank’s visit, and it was this Committee that planned 
the events for the “Tank Week.” (Larger cities were sometimes privileged enough to have the 
tanks than longer for one week, but a week-long event was the usual experience.) Some towns 
had airplanes drop pamphlets in advance of the tank to promote the tank’s arrival.
246
 For others, 
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enthusiastic Tank Bank Committees used the tank to stage a mock battle, complete with model 
trenches and artillery pieces. 
 
Figure 5. Message dropped from British Aeroplane.
247
 
 
Afterwards, mayors from around Britain wrote back to the Tank Bank Organizers, 
primarily Louis Wilson, to emphasize the importance of the Tank Bank campaign and the “Tank 
Week” events which surrounded the arrival of the tanks. “I shall retain a very pleasant memory of 
the visit of the Tank to Blackburn,” said one letter, with another proclaiming that “tank week to us 
in Rochdale will always be a pleasant memory.” 
248
 Notably, both Rochdale and Blackburn were 
smaller towns, below the population threshold of 250,000 earlier prescribed for the Tank Bank 
campaign, and other letters from Oldham and Aberavon point to other towns below the population 
threshold. Though not every town in Britain could be favored with a visit from the tank, the tank 
was not only a campaign for the largest cities: even small towns and rural communities had a 
chance of spotting a tank, exposing a greater number of British citizens to the tanks.  
In giving citizens a direct view of the tank, and even the chance to walk around, step 
inside, and touch the side of a tank, the Tank Bank campaign also allowed civilians to enjoy 
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personal interactions like those of the tank crews. However, civilian audiences had already been 
prepared for the tanks through the previous year’s war correspondence and photographs, giving 
them the references and concepts to understand the tanks without shock or horror. The military 
context of the tanks was hardly a detriment to their popularity in person or in imagery: 
newspapers eagerly reported on the Tank Bank proceedings even while the tanks saw action in 
France. Their double utility made it easy for reporters to construct articles that harmonized both 
features, writing such creative headlines as “In the Region of Leaden and Silver Bullets”
249
 or “A 
Batterer on the Field and a Bank at Home”
250
 to tie the fundraising efforts of the Tank Bank to the 
ongoing war.  
 
A Public Image 
The tanks were not alone or overly unique in their appearances in media or print: the 
notion of the British ‘Tommy Atkins’ soldier or a civilian ‘John Bull’ as a form of British everyman 
was present from the first year of the war and reinforced at every opportunity, whether by private 
authors or public correspondents and advertisements.
251
 Airplanes, ships, artillery pieces, and 
soldiers themselves became models and toys, preserved in china and displayed in photographs 
and exhibitions.
252
 However, the presence of tanks in low points of the war allowed reporters and 
correspondents to use the tanks as an optimistic note in an increasingly pessimistic war. The First 
World War saw the development of a home front, and consequently, the rise of the war film and 
the refinement of propaganda. Tanks were one of many subjects processed through the 
propagandist’s pen, but their novelty allowed the War Office to invent or promote associations 
without worrying about contrasting narratives from previous wars. The most impressive display 
was the development of the Tank Bank campaign: unlike advances in naval technology, or the 
                                                          
249
 "The Tank on the Tramp--Two Turns", The Graphic, December 15 1917, page 13. 
 
250
 "The Splendid Triumph of the Tank", The Graphic, December 1, 1917, page 10. 
 
251
 Gregory, “A Clash of Cultures”, A Call to Arms. 
 
252
 Jones & Howell, Popular Arts of the First World War. 
 101 
 
changes in guns and artillery, tanks were land-based, mobile, and entertaining, allowing citizens 
to see and feel the tanks and fix their image in public memory. 
The tank’s presence, whether material or imaginary, in Britain between 1916 and 1918 
reached beyond the tank’s actual contribution to the war. Fuller’s brilliant imagination could not 
overcome the material shortages of the tank supply chain, and the men of the tank crews could 
not manufacture victories with their limited resources and growing exhaustion. However, the vivid 
imagery and novelty of the tanks provided newspapers, photographers, and War Office 
propagandists with the focus needed to bring new life to war bond fundraising and popular 
imagination. The tanks made slight contributions to the movement of the war—but they made 
breakthroughs in British war memory for those who experienced the war by proxy. Tanks allowed 
the British to reclaim a technical advantage over their opponents, but also provided a chance to 
relax, to enjoy something about the war by laughing at it. Tanks overtook British cinema more 
thoroughly than they ever overtook a ridge or embankment, and even if the first sight of them 
prompted horror, it was easier and more convenient to emphasize the jolly, ambling movements 
of the machines. Capitalizing on the tanks took a financial turn with the deployment of the Tank 
Banks, coercing civilian support for the war effort by using the novelty of the tanks to encourage 
donations. Civilians were encouraged to see the tanks from a positive and encouraging 
perspective, making it easy for propaganda efforts to reignite popular support for the war under 
the banner of the tanks.
253
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CONCLUSION 
In his book exploring the history of the tank, Patrick Wright wrote of his visit to a church in 
Swaffham Prior, a village in Cambridgeshire, and his discovery of a set of stained-glass windows 
in the parish church:  
It was not a cherub or a host of singing angels that hovered in the top rose light, 
but a cigar shaped Zepplin wedged up against a starlit sky. … The window was 
packed with weapons, but none seemed more incongruous than the tank – a 
looming rhomboid phantom with a couple of large cart-like wheels trailing behind 
as it rose out of the mud to bear down invincibly on the infernal Huns who were 
spraying scarlet liquid fire over helpless Tommies in the adjacent window. This 
silvery mass certainly glowed, but hardly with the whitened light of Easter – more 
like the glimmer of a smeared lunette above an old public lavatory, or the 
sluggish gleam of a fish turning in a muddy pool.
254
 
After the war, memorials emerged all over the nation, but the windows of Swaffham Prior stood 
out for their explicit inclusion of weaponry alongside the men memorialized there. Not only did the 
village choose to include the tank alongside other aspects of the war, but they included it in a 
religious context, placing it where parishioners would see it regularly.
255
 Though made of glass 
and framed by beautiful colors, the tanks pictured in the Swaffham Prior windows were still 
distinctly identifiable as Mark I model tanks, uniting the emotional pull of war memorials to the 
image of the tanks themselves. 
After the armistice, the making of memorials provided opportunities for British citizens to 
commemorate the early tanks in a variety of forms, like the stained glass discussed above.  The 
enthusiastic campaigning of the Tank Banks provided easy opportunities for citizens to retain 
souvenirs and memorabilia from the Tank Bank events, and the various toys and tank products 
released during the war paved the way for similar products after the war. The climax of the Tank 
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Bank campaign was the victory of West Hartlepool, with the greatest amount of money raised per 
capita, earning them the tank “Egbert” in 1919. With the development of the Mark V tanks in 1918 
and the continual improvement in tank models, Mark I and Mark II tanks that had survived the war 
soon proved useless in any functional capacity, prompting the British government to donate them 
to dozens of towns around Britain as a show of gratitude for their participation in the Tank Bank 
fundraising.  
However, the impact of the tanks was hardly limited to decorative and commemorative 
instances. The British approach to warfare would be influenced by the introduction of the tanks, 
and the debate over mechanization—whether it was wiser to invest in raw manpower, or to 
replace that manpower with machinery—began during the war only to intensify afterwards. While 
the tanks had accomplished much in 1917 and 1918, their presence and victories did not decide 
the debate immediately in favor of mechanization. In Larson’s The British Army and the Theory of 
Armored Warfare, 1918-1940, he explains that the dominating perspective of the British Army still 
relied on the strategy of attrition, which dictated much of Haig’s actions during his time in 
command. Thanks to the strength of the British navy, Haig and other officers believed that they 
simply had to outlast the German army while the British navy blockaded the German supply lines, 
and the British army would emerge in victory simply by the number of men and amount of 
ammunition used at the front. By 1919, Larson notes that “tanks had enabled infantry to attack 
without the long artillery preparation that had meant the loss of surprise and to advance at less 
cost to themselves while inflicting greater casualties upon the enemy. Thus, in the army’s view, 
tanks reinforced rather than undermined the validity of the strategy of attrition because it made 
such a strategy more efficient.”
256
  
In the face of this debate, it was clear that the work of J.F.C. Fuller had only just begun, 
and his continued efforts on behalf of the Tank Corps redoubled his original position that tank 
warfare would quickly outstrip the potential of raw manpower. The formal establishment of the 
Tank Corps provided him, and other tank men, with the administrative support to encourage 
                                                          
256
 Robert H. Larson, The British Army and the Theory of Armored Warfare, 1918-1940, (London: 
Associated University Presses, 1984), 65. 
 104 
 
tactical discussion and share their experiences as tank men. Just as the civilians of Britain 
incorporated the tanks into their memorials of the war, the tank men found themselves reliving 
their memories through letter writing and publication of their memoirs. The organization of the 
Tank Corps allowed for the publication of a Tank Corps Journal, collecting both the tactical 
perspective of Fuller and the personal contributions of tank crew members both active and 
retired.  
On an administrative level, the years between the First and Second World Wars saw a 
slow but certain shift in the army’s consideration of mechanization. With the experience of the 
First World War, the Tank Corps were able to present realistic examples of the utility of tanks in 
cooperation with other branches, but the concept of tanks operating independently of infantry or 
artillery was rarely entertained seriously among British tacticians as the Second World War 
began. The concept of a tank army, or of tank battles fought primarily by tanks, was mostly 
ignored even as other nations developed their own Tank Corps. 
During the interwar period, tank administrators faced a lack of funding for mechanization 
efforts, making it even more difficult to develop the Tank Corps beyond its wartime dimensions.
257
 
Fuller remained with the Tank Corps until 1934, and he continued to write and publish tactical 
papers and articles on the development of armored warfare and mechanization in the army after 
the war’s end. A British victory did not guarantee that administrators looked on the tank favorably, 
since army administrators assumed that the tank was a situational weapon shaped by its use on 
the Western Front. Fuller’s writings sought a total replacement of man- and horsepower with 
tanks, infringing on the pride of the cavalry and earning him further enemies within the army’s 
administration.  
In the course of his publishing, Fuller gained the support of Sir Basil Liddell Hart, the man 
who would later write the published history of the Tank Corps in 1946. As the identified tank 
advocates, Fuller and Liddell Hart continued the mechanization debate from the perspective of 
                                                          
257
 J. P. Harris, “British Armour 1918-40: Doctrine and Development”, in Armoured Warfare, ed. J. P. Harris 
and F. N. Toase, (London: B. T. Batsford Ltd, 1990), 40. 
 105 
 
the tanks, occasionally attempting to appeal to other groups to diversify their arguments, but 
usually reiterating repeated arguments about the life-saving potential of the tanks and their ability 
to outperform cavalry, infantry, and artillery alike. 
This would prove one of the most dramatic contrasts between German and British tactics 
in the Second World War: despite the fact that the British Army had developed and deployed 
tanks first in the First World War, it was the German Army that invested more heavily during the 
interwar period to deploy fully prepared tank units in the Second World War, taking the lessons of 
British tacticians and applying them in the formation of their early armored units.  
In his book, Patrick Wright follows the tank from its initial commemoration in British 
church windows through its use in the Second World War, featured as a visual indicator of 
German occupation; its incorporation into Soviet occupation and its presence as the Soviet 
Union’s key land weapon, used in both military events and celebratory parades; and the tank’s 
participation in the Six Day War, reliant on its inclusion in the Israeli Defense Force and a new 
generation of Israeli commanders who proudly described their tanks as living beings. . His work 
asks that his readers look not only to the tactical and physical developments of the tank, but to 
the cultural adaptations of the tank, as tank imagery is used first in one nation, then another. As 
tank technology developed, gained support in various nations, and gained more tactical support, 
their military and cultural impact followed apace, reaching far beyond the modest experiments of 
a few British engineers in the early twentieth century.  
Though tanks have thrown off their British designers and become weapons of whichever 
nation chooses to use them, the former Tank Corps and the camp at Bovington take pride in their 
contribution to the story of the tanks. Now, the former Tank Corps adopts the title of the Royal 
Tank Regiment, and the former training grounds of Bovington have been converted into a Tank 
Museum, complete with a display ground where working tanks are driven across obstacles and 
over barriers—not to impress royalty or eager engineers, but to delight tourists and school groups 
visiting the museum. The nearby town of Lulworth, where the recruits of Bovington sought 
occasional respite from their training, still occasionally rumbles with the transit of the Tank 
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Regiment’s current vehicles, and hiking trails around Lulworth Cove are often closed off due to 
tank training in the area. The anniversary of Cambrai Day, November 20, is commemorated by 
the Royal Tank Regiment with a parade, and the flag of the Royal Tank Regiment is much the 
same as the flag flown by General Elles on that day in 1917. Though their history may not be as 
long as that of other regiments, the Royal Tank Regiment celebrates the British story of the tank, 
working alongside the Tank Museum to preserve the artifacts of the past while working forward to 
the future.  
 
Between the tacticians, tank crews, and civilian writers, the tanks were subject to a 
number of influences and interpretations, featuring as both heroes and villains in various 
perspectives. Though these audiences may not have always been aware of each other, the 
audiences themselves participated in a conversation of their own as the tanks grew and 
developed. Tacticians and administrators, based on their attitudes towards the tanks, laid the 
foundations for the production of the tanks, and their support (or lack thereof) allowed the tank 
crews to train with their tanks and face action with the backing of their administrators. Major Fuller 
was one of the key participants in this conversation, taking an important administrative stance to 
argue for tank production and to coordinate the development of tank tactics; his presence and 
fervent publications was a crucial foundation of the early Tank Corps and gave the tank crews 
room to develop their own experiences atop his hard work. Of course, Fuller’s work would have 
been for naught if the crews themselves were not committed to the tanks: the formation of a unit 
identity, complete with a badge, regimental colors, and formal training camps, allowed Fuller’s 
commanding officer General Hugh Elles to match Fuller’s administrative efforts with real 
battlefield results. Establishing and maintaining morale, even in the face of administrative 
difficulties, gave the tank crews necessary consistency and allowed them to act with confidence 
in their battle experience, negotiating tactics on a smaller scale and incorporating change 
sometimes on a whim to work with the infantry and other tank crews in the moment. 
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When reporting on the actions of the tanks, newspapers used the testimonies of both 
tank crews and war correspondents, describing the tank actions with equal reference to the tanks 
and the men inside them. However, newspapers had little desire to publish detailed tactical 
discussions, and so the testimonies quoted emphasized the adventurous, dynamic features of the 
tanks rather than their tactical applications. The work of the tacticians, administrators, and 
designers faded into the background, while the tank crews and the tanks themselves emerged as 
the focus of most tank stories. Balancing the humanity of the tank crews with the machinery of the 
tanks was more effectively accomplished by tank men themselves, writing their memoirs after the 
war, but the civilian understanding of machinery in a military setting provided important 
opportunities to reinforce national sentiment and to begin moving away from a strictly 
anthropological assessment of warfare. Including the tanks in war stories placed them alongside 
other technical developments, such as airplanes, submarines, and battleships, to diversify the 
visual and cultural understanding of British military capability. Though simpler than the tactical 
evaluations or lived experiences of tank crews, the development of tank souvenirs and reporting 
of tank stories reached the largest audience of them all, and prepared British civilians to 
incorporate the tanks into war memorials and the continuing memory of the First World War.  
The different chapters of this thesis emphasized the variety of experiences connected to 
early British tanks on the Western Front. Though the subject area was narrow in focus, the variety 
available from such a small focus reflected the wider amount of work to be done. The intersection 
of military history and technology reaches far earlier than the First World War, but the deployment 
of the tank provided a useful milestone to measure development.  
Furthermore, the First World War also provided interesting examples of technical 
developments working in concert, devised and tested separately but used together in a battlefield 
environment. The tank itself was a combination of influences, originating with civilian machines 
and finding application in a military setting. The tank claimed some uniqueness for its specific 
military development, but technologies like the airplane and submarine also saw use in the First 
World War. The increased use of submarine warfare was one instance of a technology that 
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developed a niche in a military capacity, though across a greater period of time than was afforded 
the early tank. The development of the airplane was an even closer comparison to the tanks, as 
airplanes also rose to prominence in the First World War and developed significant tactical 
meanings for their ability to survey an area and carry ordinance to enemy lines. From a British 
perspective, the development of the Royal Air Force mirrored the early organization of the Tank 
Corps as it became the Royal Tank Regiment, and comparing the two organizations from an 
administrative and tactical perspective could allow for greater insight into the incorporation of new 
technologies into the British army.  
In a similar vein, the debates over mechanization, in which Major Fuller took care to 
establish himself rather early, have already occupied a number of books from both contemporary 
and historical perspectives. However, there is always room to reexamine these debates with the 
passage of time, and considering different audiences could bring new dimensions to the 
mechanization debate, moving beyond merely tactical discussions to consider how civilians 
viewed these debates, and how much information was available to civilians for them to judge the 
debates on their own.  
Moving beyond Britain and into continental Europe also provides further opportunities for 
research of this kind. The French army developed tanks at the same time as British engineers 
were testing their early models, and it was mostly thanks to Haig’s enthusiasm that the British 
tanks were deployed first, rather than allow the Allied Powers to fully develop a French model to 
go into action alongside its British counterparts.
258
 The British and French experiences offer 
interesting comparisons, between the variety of models and the interaction with civilian engineers 
in the process of finding a useable machine. The German experience in the First World War 
presents less direct comparison, but moving into the interwar years provides interesting 
perspectives from the German army, even in the wake of the Treaty of Versailles. Heinz 
Guderian, one of Germany’s earliest tank tacticians, admitted that Germany was slow to learn 
from the deployment of the British tanks, and the first tanks developed by the Germany army 
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were disappointing in comparison, but the pace of adaptation during the interwar years meant 
that the Second World War presented a much different atmosphere for tank deployment than the 
First World War.
259
  
This thesis is by no means exhaustive, for even after surveying the various audiences 
involved with early British tanks and their perceptions of those tanks, there remain multiple 
avenues for further research. Whether one chooses to study British tanks from the position of 
military history or cultural history, British tanks in the First World War cannot be evaluated as if 
they meant the same thing in every situation. It is the variety of audiences present from 1916 to 
1918 that give the early British tanks their differing meanings: tanks might be an armored car, a 
tactical breakthrough, or a humorous plaything depending on who was describing them. The 
perceptions of the men and women who interacted with the tanks—those “not quite mechanical” 
features of a mechanical development—form a complex network of meaning beyond the technical 
advances of the tank itself.  
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